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End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can
and Should Be Overruled
JACK M. BEERMANN
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, decided in 1984, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced a startling new approach to judicial review of statutory
interpretation by administrative agencies, which requires courts to defer to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Although it was perhaps
hoped that Chevron would simplify judicial review and increase deference
to agency interpretation, the opposite has occurred. Chevron has
complicated judicial review and, at best, it is uncertain whether it has
resulted in increased deference to agency interpretation. In fact, for
numerous reasons, Chevron has been a failure on any reasonable measure
and should be overruled. Further, overruling Chevron would be consistent
with the practice of stare decisis because it is a judge-made rule, has
proven unworkable in practice, is inconsistent with a governing statute,
and has not spawned settled expectations that would be upset if it is
overruled. Finally, the Chevron doctrine should be replaced either by
reviving, with minor modifications, pre-Chevron practice, or with a
slightly modified version of Skidmore deference.
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End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can
and Should Be Overruled
JACK M. BEERMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,1 decided in 1984, the Supreme Court
announced a startling new two-step approach to judicial review of statutory
interpretation by administrative agencies, requiring courts to defer to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.2 Chevron stated that a statute
is unambiguous only if Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue, which, if applied as written, means that a high proportion
of statutes are likely to be found ambiguous. Once a statute is found to be
ambiguous, Chevron requires the reviewing court to approve any
reasonable or permissible construction.3 This standard appears to be very
*
Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
© 2009, Jack M. Beermann, all rights reserved. The title is adapted from Justice Breyer’s separate
opinion in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part), in which Justice Breyer advocated eliminating the requirement, imposed in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), that federal courts deciding qualified immunity cases resolve the
constitutional merits first. The Court heeded Justice Breyer’s call in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct
808 (2009). Thanks to Bill Anderson, Ron Cass, Alan Feld, Mike Harper, Linda Jellum, Gary Lawson,
and Richard Murphy for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to David Rod and Michelle
Kick, Boston University School of Law classes of 2011 and 2009, respectively, for excellent research
assistance.
1
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2
Some commentators have found the Chevron decision to represent a sharp break with past
practice. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural
and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239,
1259 n.78 (2002) (“Although Chevron was drafted to appear more as an evolution than a revolution in
the Court’s thinking there can be no serious doubt that Chevron represented a significant shift in the
Court’s interpretive theory.”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1062 (1995)
(describing Chevron as a “landmark decision[] that signaled a turning point in the substantive review of
agency decisions”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1093 (2008) (noting that “Chevron is often described as having revolutionized the jurisprudence of
agency deference”). Merrill and Hickman point out that what was new about Chevron was the
imposition of mandatory deference in cases of ambiguity and silence. Their reading of pre-Chevron
case law was that mandatory deference existed only when Congress expressly delegated interpretive
power. To them, Chevron greatly expanded the zone of mandatory deference. Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833–34 (2001).
3
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. Chevron created what has become a well known two-step
process. Under Step One, if the reviewing court determines that Congress’s intent is clear, i.e., that
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, Congress’s clearly expressed intent
governs regardless of the agency’s views. However, if Congress’s intent is not clear, i.e., if Congress
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deferential to agency interpretation. While the Court itself might not have
intended to make great changes in administrative law,4 Chevron quickly
became the iconic representation of a completely new way of reviewing
agency interpretive decisions.5
Chevron is the most famous Supreme Court decision in the history of
administrative law, and it also seems to be administrative law’s most
highly analyzed doctrine.6 It does not take much study, however, to reveal
one basic fact about the Chevron doctrine: as a legal doctrine, it has proven
to be a complete and total failure, and thus the Supreme Court should
overrule it at the first possible opportunity.
This Article explains in detail how and why the Chevron doctrine has
failed, and it also shows that it may and should be overruled. Part II
addresses the “should”—why Chevron should be overruled; Part III
addresses the “may”—why overruling Chevron would be consistent with
the Supreme Court’s principles of stare decisis; and Part IV of this Article
presents an alternative framework for judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation decisions that does not share Chevron’s fatal defects.
In short, Chevron should be overruled for the following overlapping
sets of reasons:7
1. Chevron is contrary to the statute that governs judicial
review of statutory interpretation, 5 U.S.C. § 706, so much so
that the Court actually found it necessary to rephrase the
statutory standard in the opinion to make the statute appear
more deferential than the language passed by Congress.

has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, then under Step Two, the reviewing court must
defer to the agency’s reasonable or permissible construction of the statute. Id.
4
Others have observed, based on a review of Court papers from the time of the decision, that
Justice Stevens may not have viewed his opinion as making any great change to the practice of judicial
review in administrative law. As Tom Merrill has stated, “There is no evidence that Justice Stevens
understood his handiwork in Chevron as announcing fundamental changes in the law of judicial
review.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 420 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006). Regardless of Justice Stevens’s
intent, the language of the opinion appears to create a radically more deferential standard of review for
agency interpretations.
5
See id. at 402.
6
A Westlaw search of the JLR database conducted on August 6, 2009, returned 7287 documents
citing Chevron either in the United States Reports or the Supreme Court Reporter. For comparison, a
search for citations of another important administrative law decision in that database, Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983),
returned 1529 documents.
7
This Article does not claim that the reasons given herein are the only reasons why Chevron
should be overruled. There may be additional reasons why it would be better to abandon or
significantly reform the Chevron framework. See, e.g., Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or
Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 675, 678 (2007) (arguing that the APA framework for judicial review works better
than the Chevron framework because agencies are primarily engaged in policy-based public
administration, rather than statutory interpretation).
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2. Chevron has no adequate theoretical foundation. It
was built on a faulty premise concerning congressional intent
and was (and is) contrary to established traditions concerning
the distribution of authority in statutory interpretation cases,
at least as embodied in many of the cases decided after the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
3. The Chevron opinion was poorly constructed and
unclear on basic issues such as the proper role of
interpretation, legislative history, and policy arguments. It is
still not clear whether Chevron concerns review of statutory
interpretation or review of policy decisions.
4. A short time after establishing the Chevron doctrine,
the Court created a new version of Step One, which allows
the reviewing court to employ the “traditional tools of
statutory interpretation” to determine whether Congress’s
intent is clear.8 This threw the doctrine into disarray and
spawned three competing versions of Step One, leading to
conflicting lines of cases. Currently, the application of the
Chevron doctrine is highly unpredictable, and the decision
itself is cited for opposing propositions.
5. For a variety of reasons, Chevron apparently has not
had the desired effect of significantly increasing deference to
agencies. The reasons for this failure are not altogether clear,
but include: first, that Chevron is so pliable that courts
applying it can still reach any desired result; second, that
agencies may have become more adventurous in their
statutory interpretation, leading to increased likelihood of
rejection on judicial review;9 and third, that judges may be
simply unwilling to defer to interpretations with which they
disagree.
6. The Supreme Court does not even cite Chevron in a
high proportion of the cases in which it arguably applies.
8
The “traditional tools” language actually appeared in the Chevron opinion, but it was not until
later that this language spawned an alternative, less deferential, version of Step One. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843 n.9 (“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect.”).
9
This reason may seem inconsistent with the prior claim that courts have not actually become
more deferential to agencies. There is no question, however, that in many instances the invocation of
Chevron has been accompanied by the promise of deference, which may mislead agencies into
believing that their output will receive more deference on judicial review. This could actually lead to
an increase in rejection of agency action. It is as if the police established speed traps in an area in
which they announced they would engage in less intensive enforcement. Drivers misled by the signals
from the authorities or overly optimistic about their ability to evade detection may continue to speed.
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Something is amiss when the Court does not find it necessary
to employ the test that it created to govern a class of cases.
7. The Chevron decision created uncertainty about when
it applies, making it necessary for the Court to construct a
doctrine to determine just that. This doctrine, referred to as
Chevron Step Zero, is even more uncertain than the Chevron
doctrine itself.
8. All of the uncertainty, noted above, surrounding the
application of Chevron and when it applies has forced the
Justices and parties to expend inordinate resources arguing
over the Chevron doctrine instead of what they should be
arguing about, Congress’s intent and the rationality of agency
policy in the particular case. In short, the litigation costs
surrounding Chevron appear to outweigh any benefits the
doctrine may have created.
9. Chevron encourages irresponsible agency and judicial
behavior. Agencies expecting that their interpretive decisions
will be reviewed under a deferential version of Chevron are
free to disregard congressional intent and impose their own
policy views even when it is possible to have at least a good
sense of how Congress would have wanted the agency to act.
Reviewing courts can brush off serious challenges to agency
decisions by invoking Chevron without engaging whether the
agency is thwarting imperfectly expressed congressional
intent.
10. Consensus on the proper understanding and
application of the Chevron framework is unlikely in the
foreseeable future. In addition to the reasons for the
indeterminacy of the Chevron doctrine discussed above, the
unlikelihood of this changing is evidenced by the fact that,
despite appearances, there is no stable constituency on the
Court for Chevron deference and the scholarly commentary
on Chevron has not come to consensus on basic issues
surrounding Chevron. In short, after twenty-five years of
instability, there is no reason to believe that the Chevron
framework is likely to become a stable decisionmaking
process.
Chevron’s multiple meanings make analysis of Chevron very difficult.
In fact, a number of the criticisms raised in this Article may appear to be in
conflict with each other. Some of the criticisms apply only when the
reviewing court applies the original highly deferential version of Chevron
under which Step One is very narrow and Step Two has virtually no teeth.

2010]

END THE FAILED CHEVRON EXPERIMENT NOW

785

Other criticisms apply to later versions of Chevron under which Step One
has become very broad, with many cases resolved on the basis of clear
congressional intent that does not meet the original standard of Congress
having “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Still other
criticisms apply simply because the Court has not provided a methodology
for choosing among the various versions of the Chevron framework and
behaves as if Chevron has a single, clear meaning.
Multiple versions of Chevron can mislead agencies and courts. People
often see what they want to see. Lower courts and agencies may seize on
highly deferential versions of Chevron—courts to clear the docket and
agencies to test the limits of statutory authority. Both may then be
surprised when the Supreme Court employs a less deferential
understanding of Chevron Step One to overrule an agency’s statutory
construction that had been approved on review by a lower court.
Overruling Chevron would also be consistent with the reasoning the
Court has used in recent cases in support of the permissibility of overruling
precedent within traditions of stare decisis.10 First, overruling Chevron
would not upset settled expectations.11 This is especially true given that
the application of Chevron is so unpredictable. No one rationally orders
their affairs in reliance on Chevron deference. Second, Chevron is a judgemade rule that did not purport to be based on statutory interpretation that
Congress might have relied upon in shaping the law.12 Third, experience
with Chevron since it was decided shows that it is a failure.13 In other
words, overruling Chevron would not merely be the result of changed
views, but rather would be informed by experience that could not have
been available at the time Chevron was decided. These factors confirm
that overruling Chevron would be consistent with the principles that
govern whether it is permissible for a court to overrule its precedent.
One issue that needs to be discussed is what it would mean for the
Court to overrule Chevron since it represents a decision procedure rather
than a rule of substantive law and may have little if any actual effect on the
outcome of cases. On the first point, there is nothing odd about overruling
a decision process or standard like the Chevron doctrine. The Court has,
for example, changed the standard for evaluating free exercise claims
without overruling any particular substantive decision,14 the Court has
10
See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817 (2009) (overruling the requirement imposed in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), that courts reach constitutional merits before determining
whether civil rights defendants are immune).
11
See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2081 (2009) (that a decision that has proven
unworkable is “a traditional ground for overruling it”).
12
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995).
13
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965)).
14
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 883–85 (1990).
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adjusted the standards used to evaluate whether expert testimony is
admissible,15 and the Court has made adjustments to the standards it uses to
determine whether decisions or legislation should have retroactive effect.16
The best argument against overruling Chevron is that it has no effect on the
actual outcome of cases. Thus, it is not worth taking the trouble to
overrule it. Even if that is all true, it supports overruling Chevron if for no
other reason than to save the time and effort lawyers and judges devote to
exploring the vagaries of the Chevron doctrine.
If Chevron is overruled, what should take its place? The way to
answer this question is to refer to the APA: when a federal court conducts
judicial review, it should decide all questions of law as the APA appears to
direct.17 This is not to suggest prohibiting reviewing courts from paying
close attention to agency views, but the ultimate judicial decision should be
based on what the court finds to be the best reading of the statute.18 If,
however, genuine ambiguity leaves a range of potential meanings, the
Court should return to pre-Chevron practice and determine whether the
agency has interpreted the statutory provision in a reasonable manner, with
attention to the meaning of the statute, its purpose and history, and the
wisdom of its policy choices under the arbitrary, capricious standard.19
When an agency has been expressly granted power to create law, the
reviewing court should, as in pre-Chevron practice, determine if the
agency’s interpretation is within the delegation of authority and passes
muster under the arbitrary, capricious test.
Although questions of meaning are often bound up with policy
decisions, the two should be separated as much as possible, and reviewing
courts should review agency policy decisions under the applicable standard
of review separately from questions of statutory meaning. For example, in
Chevron itself, the Court should have separated the question of whether the
bubble concept was linguistically consistent with the statutory phrase
15

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585, 587–89 (1993).
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299–301, 310 (1989); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 105–07 (1971).
17
See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
18
This Article does not take a position on whether reviewing courts should use all of the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, including the canons of construction to arrive at the best
interpretation. As many have observed over several decades, the canons are unreliable and
manipulable, and thus using them could preserve or even augment the freedom courts have under
Chevron. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (“[T]here are two
opposing canons on almost every point. . . . [T]he construction contended for must be sold . . . by
means other than the use of the canon.”).
19
Practice under this standard would not differ from Chevron in one important respect—unless
the court finds that a statute has only one permissible meaning, the agency should remain free to alter
its interpretation within an allowable range. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005). This is not inconsistent with the judicial obligation to determine the
law because the court has found that the statute does not clearly decide which of a range of meanings
represents the best understanding of congressional intent.
16
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“stationary source,” from the question of whether adopting that meaning
made regulatory sense. The former question should be reviewed de novo,
while the latter question should be reviewed under the deferential arbitrary,
capricious standard.20
The virtues of this approach are many. Review of agency statutory
interpretation would be much simpler if the focus was on the meaning of
the statute rather than on whether and how Chevron applies to the
particular case. This would save litigation costs and force everyone—
courts, challengers, and agencies—to focus on Congress’s expressed
intent, which ought to be the most important factor in statutory
interpretation and application. Agencies would be less able to frustrate
Congress’s intent by hiding behind Chevron on judicial review. And most
importantly, judicial review of agency statutory interpretation would be
more consistent with governing constitutional and statutory principles.
Overruling Chevron may also have vices. Insofar as Chevron has
made it simpler to dispose of at least a small category of cases—judicial
review of rules issued under plainly ambiguous statutes—some cases may
become more complicated to litigate and decide. This would lead to
increased costs and might give some litigants more hope of prevailing than
they might otherwise have had, which would encourage litigation. These
effects might be especially likely if Chevron is more effective in lower
courts than in the Supreme Court. Further, if one credits Chevron’s
argument that agency interpretation is preferable to interpretation by
unaccountable federal judges, then overruling Chevron would have costs in
terms of democratic accountability.
In sum, as the following analysis illustrates, although abandoning the
Chevron doctrine might create problems, they are not severe enough to
justify holding onto the failed Chevron standard. At a minimum, judgment
should be reserved until Chevron can be compared with the replacement
for the Chevron regime offered below.
Part II of this Article elaborates on how Chevron has failed. Part III
elaborates on the permissibility of overruling Chevron. Part IV discusses
what it would mean to overrule Chevron and proposes a replacement for
the Chevron doctrine. Part V concludes.

20
See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 862 F.2d 330, 335–36 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (“Our next task is to review the substance of the ICC’s decision independent of questions of
statutory authority. [A] question remains whether the agency’s announced decision . . . was ‘arbitrary
or capricious.’”). The Supreme Court has used language that appears to endorse this approach, but it
has not actually engaged in arbitrary, capricious review of agency interpretations. See Household
Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004) (“Because § 1605 is ambiguous, the Board’s
regulation implementing § 1605 ‘is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” (quoting United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001))).
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II. HOW CHEVRON HAS FAILED
The ways in which Chevron has failed can be sorted into three rough
and somewhat overlapping categories. The first category comprises
Chevron’s intrinsic failings, both the doctrine and the opinion. The second
category involves problems that have arisen in the application of the
Chevron doctrine. The third category involves the costs and benefits of the
Chevron doctrine. As a fourth and related measure of Chevron’s failings,
this Article discusses the lack of any likelihood of consensus at the Court
or in scholarly commentary surrounding Chevron. In short, the failure of
Chevron as a credible legal standard is illustrated well by the fact that after
twenty-five years, arguments persist in the cases and commentary over
basic issues such as how many steps Chevron really has and whether
Chevron represents a sensible decision process.
A. Intrinsic Chevron Failings
The first two of the enumerated reasons for overruling Chevron fall
into the “intrinsic failings” category, namely that Chevron has no adequate
theoretical foundation and that it is contrary to the statute that governs
judicial review of agency action.21
1. Chevron Seems Inconsistent with the APA
The most startling thing about Chevron initially is that it appears
inconsistent with the APA’s judicial review provisions.22 APA section 706
states that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”23 In section
706(2), the statute provides that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be (A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law[.]”24 These seem to be relatively clear statements by Congress
intended to assign resolution of legal issues to reviewing courts, not to
administrative agencies. As many courts, including the Supreme Court,
have noted, the APA arose out of years of study and debate, and therefore
its language should not be lightly disregarded.25
21

The third reason that the Chevron opinion was poorly constructed and unclear on important
issues straddles the first two categories of Chevron failings—intrinsic problems and problems in
application. It fits better into the second category, and thus it is discussed there.
22
I cannot hope to improve on John Duffy’s explanation of how Chevron is inconsistent with the
text and legislative history of the APA. See John E. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–211 (1998).
23
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (emphasis added).
24
Id. (emphasis added).
25
See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 523, 547–48 (1978)
(noting that the APA was a legislative enactment that settled “long-continued and hard-fought”
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The legislative history also supports reading the APA as assigning
primary responsibility for resolution of legal questions to the courts. As
John Duffy has explained:
The first sentence of Section 706 of the APA requires a
reviewing court to “decide all relevant questions of law” and
to “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” The
legislative history of the APA leaves no doubt that Congress
thought the meaning of this provision plain. As
Representative Walter, Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Administrative Law and author of the House Committee
Report on the bill, explained to the House just before it
passed the bill, the provision “requires courts to determine
independently all relevant questions of law, including the
interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions.” Thus
Justice Scalia, in championing Chevron, admits that the 79th
Congress was laboring under “the quite mistaken assumption
that questions of law would always be decided de novo by
the courts.” But if Congress enacted that assumption into law
with Section 706, what power do the courts have to overturn
the decision as “mistaken?”26
The APA’s judicial review provisions should be understood in light of
the politics surrounding the passage of the APA and the ebbs and flows of
deference to agency legal decisions in the pre-APA period. The APA was
the product of a hard fought political battle over the place of the agencies
in the government and the future of New Deal policies. In George
Shepherd’s view, the administration largely won, with conservatives
achieving only small reforms aimed at restraining agency behavior in the
name of greater protection of individual rights.27 McNollgast adopts a
similar view, with an interesting twist.28 They agree with Shepherd that
the Democrats won the war, if not every battle, over the APA, but they
disagree somewhat with Shepherd’s conclusions on the politics of the
APA’s constraints on executive power. McNollgast points out that the
Democrats could see a Republican presidency on the horizon, but given the
long-term Democratic control over judicial appointments, they viewed a
contentions (citation omitted)); In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (tracing the
legislative history leading up to enactment of the APA).
26
Duffy, supra note 22, at 193–94 (citations omitted); see also McNollgast, The Political Origins
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 200 (1999) (“[C]ourts, not agencies,
are the locus of both constitutional and statutory interpretation.”).
27
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1581–82 (1996).
28
See McNollgast, supra note 26, at 200 (“By granting authority to the (New Deal dominated)
courts to interpret agency statutes, it prevents the new (Republican dominated) agency officials from
altering policy by announcing a new interpretation of the statute.”).
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relatively constraining APA, enforced on judicial review, as a method for
consolidating New Deal policies against Republican attempts to adopt new
policies.29 Thus, to McNollgast, non-deferential judicial review, such as
independent judicial resolution of legal issues, was preferred by Democrats
as a means of protecting New Deal policies from Republican reversal.30
Not surprisingly, the Executive Branch took a different view of the
meaning of the APA at the time it was passed. The Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act stated simply that the judicial
review provisions of the APA were meant to codify existing law.31 There
are two problems with taking the Attorney General’s view at face value.
First, existing law was so unclear on many important issues, especially
with regard to judicial review of legal interpretations, that codification
would have meant that the APA provision had basically no discernible
content. Second, the Attorney General seems to be stating the Executive
Branch’s case for a more lenient standard of review, not providing an
objective viewpoint on congressional intent.32 Thus, although the Attorney
General’s Manual should be considered when trying to understand the
APA, especially in those cases in which the Manual’s interpretation is
contrary to the Executive Branch’s interests, it may be unreliable when it
advances a pro-executive point of view.
In Chevron itself, the Court’s departure from the statutory language is
made most apparent when the Court paraphrases the APA’s standard of
review. The Court stated that when Congress explicitly leaves a statutory
gap for the agency to fill, “legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”33 The actual text of the APA states simply that the reviewing
court should overturn agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”34 The
addition of the word “manifestly” and the phrase “contrary to the statute”
29
This would support, for example, legal doctrines that make it difficult for agencies to change
course. See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 984 (2003)
(explaining how the Supreme Court’s application of the arbitrary, capricious test makes it difficult for
agencies to change their policies). Recently, the Court rejected the argument that the arbitrary,
capricious test should apply in a less deferential manner when an agency reverses a prior policy. See,
e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009).
30
McNollgast, supra note 26, at 200, 206.
31
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 93 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL]. With regard to APA
section 10(e), codified as 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006), the Attorney General’s Manual states, “This restates
the present law as to the scope of judicial review.” Id. at 108.
32
George Shepherd offers strong arguments against the Supreme Court’s tendency to defer to the
Attorney General’s Manual on questions involving interpretation of the APA. In general, Shepherd
argues, the administration would have preferred weaker restraints on agencies than those contained in
the APA, and the Attorney General’s Manual portrays the APA in that light. See Shepherd, supra note
27, at 1682–83.
33
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (emphasis added).
34
5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
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add deferential atmospherics, which might be appropriate with regard to a
common law standard but seems beyond the proper judicial role in a
statutory matter. The Court should have at least quoted the actual statutory
language before construing it to allow deference to the agency’s view.35
In the pre-APA period, although there was a long tradition of
deference to agency interpretations,36 legal doctrine on the distribution of
interpretive authority between courts and agencies was unclear and it often
caused controversy. Some decisions indicated that courts should defer to
agency interpretations, while others indicated the opposite. On the
deference side, in the years before the passage of the APA, the Court gave
“peculiar weight” to an agency practice that was supported by a
“contemporaneous” agency interpretation of the statute,37 and stated that
the judicial review function was to “determine that there has been . . . an
application of the statute in a just and reasoned manner.”38 Standing
against deference, the Supreme Court had also declared that “[t]he
interpretation of the meaning of statutes . . . is exclusively a judicial
function,”39 and in the prominent Hearst decision, the Court appeared to
reserve decisions on pure legal questions to itself, but then deferred in
reviewing agency application of law to fact.40 The Court attempted to sum
up the issue in Skidmore, in which it stated that the degree to which
reviewing courts should defer to agency legal decisions “will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”41 To put it
mildly, prior to the passage of the APA, there were competing traditions
and unclear standards concerning whether agency legal decisions should
receive deference on judicial review.
After the passage of the APA but before Chevron, at least some of the
time, the federal courts seem to have understood that under the APA, legal
interpretations were for independent judicial resolution. During this
period, the issue of deference to agency legal decisions faded away
somewhat, although it did pop up on occasion. In some pre-Chevron APA
cases, the Court simply declared the law without much attention to whether
35
The phrase “manifestly contrary to the statute” had not been used by the Supreme Court before
Chevron. A similar phrase, “plainly contrary to the statute,” was used the week before the Chevron
decision. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984). For further discussion of Step Two, see
infra note 121 and accompanying text.
36
See Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827) (emphasizing that
interpretation of a law by persons who act under and carry its provisions into effect is entitled to “very
great respect”).
37
Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
38
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941).
39
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940).
40
NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944).
41
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

792

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:779
42

the agency’s interpretation deserved deference.
For example, in the
Overton Park case, which contains the most prominent pre-Chevron
discussion of judicial review under the APA, the Court interpreted the
governing statute without even mentioning the views of the Secretary of
Transportation, whose actions were being challenged.43 The best reading
of that opinion is that the Court viewed interpretation of the statute as a
matter for judicial determination without regard to the agency’s views.44
The same is true in the Benzene Case,45 in which the Court construed
the agency’s authority under the OSH Act narrowly to avoid a potential
nondelegation problem. The Court looked at the text and legislative
history of the OSH Act and determined that the agency’s interpretation of
its authority under the Act was too broad.46 There is no hint of deference
to the agency’s views in the Court’s opinion. Thus, perhaps because of the
APA’s language, in the period between the adoption of the APA and the
Chevron decision, it appears that in many cases agency views on legal
issues received little, if any, deference on judicial review. Because they
were the most well known decisions, Chevron seemed to some to be a
42
In O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507–08 (1951), the Court behaved as
if the APA had not been passed, at least with regard to the question of deference to agency legal
conclusions. In that case, the Court appears to have applied Hearst, distinguishing between
“independent judicial ascertainment” of “‘questions of law’” and questions involving the “experience
of industry.” Id. This implicitly would involve deference à la Hearst, in which the Court stated:
[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a
proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially,
the reviewing court’s function is limited. . . . [T]he Board’s determination . . . is to
be accepted if it has “warrant in the record” and a reasonable basis in law.
Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131.
43
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 409–12 (1971).
44
The Court discussed the statutory issue in Overton Park in two different parts of the opinion. It
concluded its initial explication of the governing statute by saying, “This language is a plain and
explicit bar to the use of federal funds for construction of highways through parks—only the most
unusual situations are exempted.” Id. at 411. Later in the opinion, discussing the role of the court on
judicial review, the Court stated:
The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the scope
of his authority. . . . The reviewing court must consider whether the Secretary
properly construed his authority to approve the use of parkland as limited to
situations where there are no feasible alternative routes or where feasible alternative
routes involve uniquely difficult problems.
Id. at 415–16. The only hint of deference in the Court’s discussion of the statutory standard involves
application of the judicially declared legal standard to the particular situation: “And the reviewing
court must be able to find that the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in this case there are
no feasible alternatives or that alternatives do involve unique problems.” Id. at 416. It is possible that
the Court did not discuss deference because it found the statutory language “plain and explicit.” It
seems more likely, however, that deference simply did not seem relevant to review of the agency’s
understanding of the meaning of the statute.
45
See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 641, 659 (1980) (holding that the
Secretary of Labor exceeded authority under the OSH Act because the statute only required elimination
of significant risks of harm, rather than requiring employers to provide an absolute risk-free
workplace).
46
See id. at 641–43, 646–52 (interpreting the text and legislative history of the statute to mean
that the statute is concerned with the elimination of significant harm and not with the preservation of
absolute safety as advocated by the Secretary of Labor).
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47

striking and abrupt change in settled practice.
In other cases decided between the adoption of the APA and Chevron,
however, the Court applied a deferential standard of review, upholding
agency statutory interpretations if they were reasonable.48 For example, in
language that foreshadows Chevron, the Court concluded that the Federal
Election Commission’s statutory interpretations should receive deference
as follows:
Initially, we note that the Commission is precisely the
type of agency to which deference should presumptively be
afforded.
Congress has vested the Commission with
“primary and substantial responsibility for administering and
enforcing the Act,” providing the agency with “extensive
rulemaking and adjudicative powers.” . . .
The Commission’s position on the question before us is
clear. Since 1976, it consistently has adhered to its
construction of [2 U.S.C.] § 441a(d)(3) as not forbidding
intraparty agency agreements. . . . The Commission
consistently has upheld the agency agreements; the fact that
Commission Counsel has had the luxury of a number of
sound arguments on which to base his opinions does not
detract from the deference due the agency’s interpretations.
Hence, in determining whether the Commission’s action
was “contrary to law,” the task for the Court of Appeals was
not to interpret the statute as it thought best but rather the
narrower inquiry into whether the Commission’s construction
was “sufficiently reasonable” to be accepted by a reviewing
court. To satisfy this standard it is not necessary for a court
to find that the agency’s construction was the only reasonable
one or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.49
This language is close to but not quite the same as the apparent
meaning of the original Chevron standard as announced in the Chevron
opinion itself. In the pre-Chevron APA cases that raised deference to
agency statutory interpretation, although the Court stated the question as
47
The lower courts seemed to understand the APA as assigning authority to decide legal
questions to courts. In a Ninth Circuit opinion quoted by Duffy, the court stated, “In enacting the
Administrative Procedure Act Congress did not merely express a mood that questions of law are for the
courts rather than agencies to decide,—it so enacted with explicit phraseology.” Duffy, supra note 22,
at 194 n.408 (quoting SEC v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78, 86–87 (9th Cir. 1952)).
48
See Fed. Election Comm. v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 36–37, 39
(1981). Eskridge and Baer observe that “the Court was highly deferential to agency interpretations
before Chevron.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1120.
49
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 37–39 (citations and footnotes omitted).

794

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:779

whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, the Court engaged in a
substantial inquiry to ensure that the agency’s view was not inconsistent
with congressional intent.50 In some cases, the analysis was similar to preAPA Skidmore deference, under which the degree of deference would vary
based on numerous factors including the duration and consistency of the
agency’s interpretation, the process by which the interpretation was made,
and the relevance of agency expertise to the issues.51 It was a much
broader inquiry than Chevron’s injunction to defer unless Congress had
“directly addressed the precise question at issue.”52
What looked most different about Chevron was the bifurcation of
review into Steps One and Two and the apparently narrow domain of Step
One, in which the reviewing court would search for clear congressional
intent, together with the apparent virtual abdication of judicial authority if
the case reached Step Two, which seemed likely in the vast majority of
cases.53 In Chevron, it appeared that the Court was pulling back from any
substantial review of interpretations in cases not resolved based on clear
statutory meaning.
If Chevron is inconsistent with the APA, then this may provide an
extremely strong basis for overruling it (or quietly abandoning it).54 In a
recent decision declining to heighten judicial review under the arbitrary,
capricious standard when an agency alters a policy, the Supreme Court
relied on its Vermont Yankee principle that the APA is the final word on
standards of judicial review.55 If so, and if the Court agrees that Chevron
does not follow the APA, the Court should overrule it based on the
Vermont Yankee principle that, absent unconstitutionality, courts have no
authority to depart from the APA.

50

See id. at 39–43 (examining the language, legislative history, and purposes of a statute to
determine whether agency interpretation is reasonable); Indus. Union Dep’t., 448 U.S. at 645–52
(same).
51
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
52
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
53
See id. at 842–43.
54
It may be argued that the Court has already abandoned Chevron to a certain extent, since it does
not cite it in many of the cases in which it seems to apply. See discussion infra notes 200–06 and
accompanying text. The problem with this argument is that in some cases the Court continues to cite
Chevron as the authoritative standard and dissenters complain about the Court’s faulty application of
Chevron. There is no question, however, that the Court does not need to employ the Chevron
framework even in cases in which deference to agency legal interpretations is an issue. See Michael C.
Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron
and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 210 (2009) (noting that Brand X makes clear that serious arbitrary
or capricious review should be applied when reviewing agency formulations of legal doctrine, even in
instances of statutory construction where Chevron deference is claimed).
55
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (holding that APA
review is not heightened when an agency revises its policy); Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson,
Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 871–74 (2007) (arguing that “the APA’s
procedural framework [is] a fundamental charter that courts should not unilaterally alter”).
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2. No Adequate Theoretical Justification for Chevron
When it was decided, some observers found Chevron to be a sharp
break with accepted principles governing the division of interpretive
authority between agencies and courts.56 When a court makes a sharp
break with established practice, the burden is on the proponents to justify
the change. To some, not only was Chevron lacking in sufficient
justification for change, it was inconsistent with the traditional judicial
authority to declare the law, embodied most famously in the statement in
Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”57 Insofar as Chevron requires
courts to accept agency interpretations that they find contrary to the best
reading of the statute, at a minimum, Chevron undercuts judicial authority
to declare the law.
In addition to what seemed to be a break with practice under the APA,
some commentators found Chevron to be a violation of, or at least in
tension with, principles of separation of powers. Very early on, Cynthia
Farina argued that Chevron was inconsistent with the norms underlying the
nondelegation doctrine and was inconsistent with the fundamental
historical and philosophical principles that support the legitimacy of the
exercise of legislative power by the government of the United States.58
Clark Byse, a prominent administrative law scholar and co-author of one of
the leading administrative law casebooks, also identified possible
separation of powers problems with the Chevron doctrine relatively soon
56
As noted, the Court itself might not have viewed Chevron as an exceptional decision. See
Merrill, supra note 4, at 420 (“There is no evidence that Justice Stevens understood his handiwork in
Chevron as announcing fundamental changes in the law of judicial review.”); Molot, supra note 2, at
1259 n.78 (“It is true that the Justices at the time did not seem to ‘realize[] the full implications of their
landmark administrative law decision in . . . Chevron.’” (quoting Robert V. Percival, Environmental
Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,613
(1993))). There is no question, however, that soon after the decision, it became viewed as establishing
a new, highly deferential, standard for reviewing agency statutory construction.
57
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also CSX Transp. v. United
States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (observing that the Chevron rule
appears to violate separation of powers principles and usurp the role of the courts to conduct statutory
interpretation); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis
of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988) (arguing that Chevron’s reasoning that a
statute’s silence or ambiguity confers interpretive power on an agency is a violation of separation of
powers principles); Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 897–98 (2009) (suggesting
that the legislature intrudes into the judicial sphere when it enacts statutes directing courts on how to
interpret statutes); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2
(1983) (noting Marshall’s conception of judicial autonomy in Marbury as suggestive of a
condemnation of judicial deference to administrative construction of law).
58
See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 478–81 (1989) (describing how the nondelegation doctrine prohibits the
legislature from ceding lawmaking authority to another entity); see also Patrick M. Garry,
Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and
Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 946–47 (2006) (detailing separation of powers
critiques of Chevron).
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after the doctrine was created. Judge Harry Edwards picked up on Byse’s
suggestion, stating in an opinion soon after Chevron was decided that
“Chevron’s mandate is perplexing, because the rule of the case appears to
violate separation of powers principles.”60 Judge Edwards’s analysis
focused on Chevron’s blanket assumption that every instance of statutory
ambiguity gives rise to an inference that Congress delegated lawmaking
power to an agency.
The point is not that Chevron actually violates separation of powers
principles or that it was actually inconsistent with pre-existing doctrine.
Rather, the point is that there was no strong normative support for Chevron
at the time it was decided, and that the doctrine was in tension in multiple
ways with the principles, doctrines, and practices that had governed
judicial review of agency legal conclusions up to that time.61 The lack of a
solid basis for the doctrine virtually guaranteed that the doctrine would be
applied inconsistently in the future as conflicting principles pulled decision
makers with disparate views in different directions. Thus, it should have
been no surprise that Chevron turned out to be unstable and difficult to
apply.62
The Supreme Court supplied two distinct normative bases for the
Chevron doctrine: first, that Congress delegated the power to construe
statutes to the agencies; and second, that agency decision making was
preferable to judicial decision making on democracy and accountability
grounds because agencies are politically responsive to the President, an
elected official. Neither of these provides sufficient normative support for
the Chevron doctrine.63
The problem with the first purported basis for the Chevron doctrine,
that statutory ambiguity indicates congressional intent to delegate
interpretive authority to the administering agency, is that in most
circumstances it is false, a presumption that might be charitably called a
legal fiction.64 The Court cited no evidence for its conclusion that statutory
59

See Byse, supra note 57, at 261.
CSX Transp., 867 F.2d at 1445 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
61
There are those who view Chevron as actually solving or at least ameliorating the separation of
powers problems inherent in the delegation of policymaking power to administrative agencies. See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 562
(2006) (describing Chevron as “a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the administrative
state”).
62
Clark Byse recognized early on that Chevron was proving to be more complicated to apply than
its simple formulation suggested. See Byse, supra note 57, at 266–67.
63
There has been a great deal of scholarly debate on the theoretical foundations of Chevron.
Over time, as might be expected, the doctrine has become more accepted, although doubts about it
continue to be raised. For a recent look at the foundations of the Chevron doctrine, see Evan J. Criddle,
Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283–98 (2008). Agency policy expertise has become a
third normative basis for Chevron deference, and is discussed infra, text accompanying notes 93–100.
64
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 562 (2009) (“[A] wide
range of legal scholars have characterized the congressional delegation rationale for Chevron as a
fiction.”). For a sample of commentators who agree with this characterization, see Einer Elhauge,
60
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ambiguity ordinarily indicates congressional intent to delegate interpretive
authority to the agency administering the particular statute. A few years
after Chevron was decided, Cass Sunstein stated that “[i]f there’s any
evidence of congressional views in the meantime, those views are very
much in accord with the original spirit of the Administrative Procedure
Act, that is, that administrative agency interpretations of law should not be
deferred to.”65 Similarly, Byse found evidence of congressional delegation
of interpretive authority to agencies lacking.66 Even Justice Scalia, one of
the Court’s strong proponents of Chevron deference, has stated that
although the presumption regarding congressional intent is sensible in
today’s world, it “represents merely a fictional, presumed intent.”67 In
short, except in those situations in which Congress explicitly delegates
interpretive authority to an agency,68 or writes a provision that is so broad
Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2132 (2002) (“[E]ven
adherents to [the Chevron] theory . . . acknowledge that the evidence of such enacting congressional
intent is ‘weak’ and even ‘fictional.’”); Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting
Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 689 (2007) (noting that Justices and commentators have recognized that the
presumption of legislative intent underlying Chevron is a “fiction” and agreeing with this view); Daniel
J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, Judicial
Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 799 (2007) (expressing skepticism
over the delegation rationale for Chevron); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2, at 871–72 (noting that the
presumption of legislative intent underlying Chevron deference “has been described by even
[Chevron’s] strongest defender [Justice Scalia] as ‘fictional’”).
65
Panel Discussion, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN.
L. REV. 353, 368 (1987); see also Criddle, supra note 63, at 1286 n.70 (citing Duffy, supra note 22, at
194–95 for the proposition that the APA requires de novo review on questions of law).
66
Byse noted:
[I]f Congress has delegated authority to determine what the statute means, the
agency’s interpretation, if reasonable, must be accepted by the courts. But the vital
pre-condition for this conclusion is the court’s determination that the agency has
been delegated the power to define the statute. To reason, as Chevron does, that
silence or ambiguity confers that kind of interpretative authority on the agency is
unacceptable, for it assumes the very point in issue and thus “fails to distinguish
between statutory ambiguities on the one hand and legislative delegations of lawinterpreting power to agencies on the other.”
Byse, supra note 57, at 261 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 466 (1987)).
67
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 517 (1989). Although Justice Scalia is known as one of the Court’s “strongest defender[s]” of
Chevron, from the beginning he stated that he did not think that he would actually defer to agency
interpretations as often as other judges because he “finds more often . . . that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws.” Gifford, supra note 64, at 799; Scalia,
supra, at 521 (emphasis omitted). Justice Scalia seems to like Chevron for two reasons: first, because
(at least until Mead) it appeared to create a comprehensive rule that would replace the pre-APA
uncertainty over the issue; and second, because when a case was decided in Step Two, it would allow
agency flexibility since agencies remain free to switch to another permissible interpretation. See id. at
517. Justice Scalia recognized that statutory ambiguity does not necessarily mean that Congress meant
to delegate interpretive authority to an administering agency. In his article, he stated, “An ambiguity in
a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires:
(1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particular
intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency.” Id. at 516.
68
There are many federal statutes that explicitly delegate interpretive authority to an agency or
official. For example, 5 U.S.C. § 3502(f)(3), which governs federal government force reductions,
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that it facially represents a delegation of policymaking authority to an
agency,69 there is little reason to believe that ambiguity signals
congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to the administering
agency and not to the reviewing court.
The conditions under which ambiguity arises support the conclusion
that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive power to agencies
whenever a statute is ambiguous. Ambiguity arises in at least three
situations: (1) when Congress has imperfectly expressed its intent;
(2) when Congress has failed to anticipate all of the situations to which a
statute might apply; and (3) when Congress has been unable or unwilling
to come to a consensus on an issue and purposely left it unresolved in the
statute. In the first and second type of case, in line with prevailing
tradition and the language of the APA, at least before Chevron, Congress
would have expected that any interpretive issue or gap would be resolved
by a federal court performing judicial review. In fact, in the first type of
case, since Congress intended to answer the issue and failed, Congress
would not have anticipated that there would be any open interpretive issues
to be resolved. In the third situation, assuming the statute is one that is
administered by an agency, Congress would certainly have intended to
delegate policymaking authority to the agency, subject to ordinary
“arbitrary, capricious” review, but there is no evidence that Congress
would have also intended to delegate power to interpret the statutory limits
of that delegated policymaking power.
There are several factors that make delegation of interpretive authority
to the administering agency unlikely. For one, it is inconsistent with the
language of the APA and with the way the APA had been applied in the
most prominent Supreme Court judicial review decisions prior to

states, “An employee with critical knowledge and skills (as defined by the Secretary concerned) may
not participate in a voluntary separation under paragraph (1)(A) if the Secretary concerned determines
that such participation would impair the performance of the mission of the Department of Defense or
the military department concerned.” 5 U.S.C. § 3502(f)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). This provision
delegates to the secretaries of various departments the power to determine the meaning of the statutory
phrase “critical knowledge and skills.” Another example of delegation is a provision in 7 U.S.C. §
87b(d)(2)(D), a statute governing agricultural products. It provides, “Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be
construed to prohibit . . . the recombination of broken corn or broken kernels, as defined by the
Secretary, with grain of the type from which the broken corn or broken kernels were derived[.]” 7
U.S.C. § 87b(d)(2)(D) (2006) (emphasis added). This provision delegates to the Secretary of
Agriculture the authority to define “recombination,” “broken corn or broken kernels,” or both.
69
For example, the Federal Communications Commission is charged with regulating the airwaves
in the “public convenience, interest, or necessity.” 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). This is obviously a
delegation to the Commission to make policy, and in a sense to define “public convenience, interest, or
necessity.” This is in sharp contrast with the myriad detailed provisions contained in the
Telecommunications Act, which may be ambiguous but do not necessarily entail such broad
delegations of interpretive authority. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 259(a) (2006) (requiring the FCC to
prescribe rules for infrastructure sharing).

2010]

END THE FAILED CHEVRON EXPERIMENT NOW

799

70

Chevron. There is no indication in any pre-Chevron understanding of the
APA that Congress meant to disable courts from closely supervising
agency compliance with law. Similarly, Congress does not usually view
agencies as trusted partners, but rather views them as competing entities
that need to be kept in line.71 The theoretical understanding of judicial
review is that it is necessary to keep agencies from straying from the
guidelines established by Congress and to provide a neutral forum for the
resolution of disputes between the government and the governed.72 And
insofar as agencies are likely to be cooperating with the President, there is
no reason to believe that any time a statute is ambiguous Congress means
to grant wide-ranging authority to the President.73
The second normative basis for Chevron—democracy and
accountability—is more complicated but ultimately insufficient to justify
the Chevron doctrine. The idea here is that because federal agencies are
more politically accountable than the federal courts, statutory interpretation
by agencies should be preferred over interpretation by the courts.74 For
several reasons, this justification for Chevron is insufficient, and in some
senses fundamentally at odds with traditional conceptions of the judicial
role in administrative law.
The first problem with the democracy and accountability justification
70

Even if Congress should now anticipate Chevron and understand that when it passes an
incomplete or ambiguous statute to be administered by an agency it is delegating interpretive power to
the agency, it makes no sense to apply Chevron’s presumption of delegated interpretive power to
statutes passed before Chevron was decided. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 551–52 n.137 (2003).
71
This is why Congress has designated some agencies as independent and located them outside of
any Executive Branch department. The idea is not to shield them from politics but rather to allow for
greater congressional, as opposed to presidential, influence. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815–16 (2009) (noting that independent agencies are protected “not from politics but
from the President”). Congress does not normally view Executive Branch agencies as allies in the
pursuit of congressional policies. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 61, 122–23, 127 (2006) (discussing the power struggle between the Executive and
Legislative Branches with regard to agency action).
72
“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies have been allowed largely on the
assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives
have been issued.” Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 446 (1989).
73
Evan Criddle recently argued that the Mead decision increases Chevron’s reliance on
congressional delegation of authority to agencies, and that it is unfortunate because the purported
delegation is often not real. Criddle, supra note 63, at 1274–75.
74
Richard Pierce has been a strong supporter of Chevron deference based on reasons of
democracy. See Pierce, supra note 61, at 562. He therefore criticizes limitations on the applicability of
Chevron as inhibiting Chevron’s democracy-enhancing potential. See id. at 584–85 (discussing how a
narrower scope of Chevron deference makes it difficult for a new President’s policy to receive judicial
approval). Pierce has also supported Chevron as allowing agencies to make policy decisions free from
judicial decisions that impose judges’ own preferences. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301,
313 (1988). Pierce also argues that if the strongest, most deferential form of Chevron were applied, it
would simplify the process of judicial review and therefore create more agreement among judges
engaged in such review. See id. at 311.
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for Chevron is that the accountability advantage for administrative
agencies, especially independent agencies, is not very clear. The Chevron
Court viewed administrative agencies as more accountable than federal
courts. The Court acknowledged that “[administrative] agencies are not
directly accountable to the people.”75 As the Court explained, the
accountability advantage is through the President:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left
to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration
of the statute in light of everyday realities.76
This discussion assumes that agency statutory interpretation is conducted
under supervision of the President or at least political appointees of the
President.
There has been a great deal of attention paid in recent years to the
degree of presidential involvement in agency decision making. There is no
question that there is more centralized control than there used to be, and
that this centralized control has become a visible, institutionalized aspect
of administrative law.77 This does not necessarily mean, however, that
agency statutory interpretation is preferable to judicial interpretation on
accountability grounds. Rather, it depends on what the courts are actually
doing when they conduct judicial review and on the actual degree of
accountability for agency statutory decisions.
This aspect of the Chevron Court’s analysis depends on a very
negative view of what judges do when construing ambiguous statutes. The
Court raised the specter of decisions made “on the basis of the judges’
personal policy preferences.”78 The Court does not entertain the possibility
that federal judges are at least trying to be faithful agents of the legislature
when they interpret. The choice between life-tenured judges’ personal
preferences and a possibly somewhat accountable agency is easy. In the
real world, however, the choice is nowhere near that clear.
Justice Scalia’s proclamation that he is more likely than other judges to
find statutes clear and unambiguous, which has led him to reject agency
views more often than might be expected from such a strong advocate of
Chevron deference, should give pause to basing Chevron deference on the
75

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
Id. at 865–66; see also infra text accompanying notes 93–104 (discussing implications of the
Court’s view that most issues of statutory interpretation are policy choices).
77
For the classic work in this area, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245 (2001) (describing and analyzing presidential involvement in the administrative process).
78
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
76
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view that judges impose their own personal policy preferences when they
construe statutes.79 Rather, like Justice Scalia, judges reading statutes may
in many instances be attempting, in good faith, to apply the statute in the
way that Congress would have wanted them to. Justice Scalia’s recent
opinion for the Court in a case involving the meaning of “visitorial
powers” in a statute granting federal regulators exclusive “visitorial
powers” over national banks is a model of careful analysis of the meaning
of ambiguous statutory language.80 The federal Comptroller of the
Currency had promulgated a regulation reading the term expansively to
preclude any state regulation of national banks, preempting even judicial
enforcement of state law against national banks.81 Although the agency’s
litigation position was more moderate, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court persuasively explains why Congress could not have intended to
preclude enforcement of state law through judicial action. This decision is
but one of many possible illustrations of how the potentially greater
political accountability of agencies does not provide a sufficient theoretical
basis for abandoning the traditional view that judicial review keeps
agencies in line with congressional intent.82
If federal judges, who are by design the least accountable officials in
the federal government, are imposing their own personal policy views, then
of course non-deferential judicial review would reduce democratic
accountability. However, when federal judges attempt, in good faith, to
discern the intent of Congress, then the choice may be better understood as
between an agency advancing its own or the President’s policy agenda and
a reviewing court trying to force the agency to stick to the agenda that
Congress established for it.83 The traditional view of judicial review is that

79
In a recent decision, Justice Scalia chided Justice Stevens for arguing in dissent that a statute’s
plain meaning was “in the eye of the beholder” within weeks of arguing, in another dissent, that the
meaning of the statute in that case was plain. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 332 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (referencing Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States,
549 U.S. 457, 479 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
80
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715–19 (2009).
81
See id. at 2714–15.
82
This decision illustrates the potential inconsistency between Justice Scalia’s propensity for
finding clear statutory meaning and competing understandings of the Chevron framework. In dissent
for himself and three others, Justice Thomas argued that since Justice Scalia’s opinion acknowledged
that the phrase “visitorial powers” is ambiguous, it should have applied Chevron and approved the
agency’s interpretation in Step Two: “The statutory term ‘visitorial powers’ is susceptible to more than
one meaning, and the agency’s construction is reasonable.” Id. at 2723 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
83
It is, of course, much more complicated than this simple statement. As Linda Jellum illustrates,
Justice Scalia’s plain meaning version of Chevron can be understood as rejecting the search for
“‘unenacted legislative intent.’” Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy
to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 751 (2007) (quoting INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Justice Scalia apparently believes that when courts stray
beyond statutory language, especially when that language is unambiguous under accepted legal
standards, they are more likely to err with regard to legislative intent than when they stick to textual
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courts prevent agencies from straying too far from congressional intent.84
As Michael Herz has succinctly stated:
[W]hile, as Chevron emphasizes, agencies have an edge on
courts in accountability, they have no such edge on Congress.
To the contrary, giving agencies too free a hand trenches on
congressional authority, thereby reducing accountability. To
the extent Congress has in fact decided something, Chevron’s
own political theory requires the courts to ensure that
agencies act consistently with that decision.85
Democracy is not only a function of whether the particular officials
making specific decisions are accountable either themselves or through
another elected official such as the President. The entire decisionmaking
process needs to be examined to determine whether there has been
maximum democratic control of the process. If an administrative agency
makes a decision that seems contrary to ambiguously expressed
congressional intent, and a federal judge, after examining the statutory text
and structure, the statute’s relationship with other statutes, the legislative
history, and the overall purposes Congress sought to achieve in the
statute,86 finds that the agency’s decision was inconsistent with probable
congressional intent, then the judge’s decision supports the basic
democratic and constitutional norm that Congress is the preferred
institution for making decisions of social policy.87 This is even more true
if Congress, by statute, has assigned this role to the courts, because then
limiting review would be contrary to Congress’s judgment that judicial
review enhances democratic (i.e., congressional) control over agencies.
analysis. See Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452–53 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
against the use of legislative history when statutory language is clear).
84
See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the PostChevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 793–94 (1991) (“In effect, judicial review preserves the principle of
legislative supremacy.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 882 (1975). As I have argued elsewhere, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court moved toward favoring aggressive judicial review as a
means of preventing federal agencies from advancing the administration’s policies to the exclusion of
Congress’s legislatively expressed preferences. This may be reflective of an evolution toward a greater
recognition of congressional primacy in administrative law. See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward
Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 732, 742–43 (2009); see also Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (“To the extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue other
priorities of the Administrator or the President, this is the congressional design.”).
85
Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under
Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 189–90 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
86
Reliance on an overall purpose is dangerous for the reasons explained by Justice Thomas in his
concurring opinion in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009). Just how far Congress was
willing to go with any particular purpose is best determined by looking at the statutory text.
Nonetheless, awareness of the purpose of a statute can help to understand the words, as long as it is
done cautiously.
87
See Indus. Union Dept. v. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674–76 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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The implications of Chevron’s view of the judicial process for the legal
system are staggering, given the wide range of judicial activism in our
current system.88 I do not necessarily disagree with it, and I have
advocated for judicial modesty in light of this and related problems with
judicial activism,89 but it is no basis for the Chevron doctrine for several
related reasons. For one, it seems disingenuous to invoke the lack of
judicial accountability in this context while feeling free to run roughshod
over the preferences of other branches of government in so many other
contexts. Another problem with this reasoning is that it no longer
accurately reflects the Chevron doctrine itself. The Court decides so many
Chevron cases in Step One that it is more accurate to characterize Chevron
in many cases as a doctrine of judicial supremacy in administrative law.90
Finally, this reasoning on its own terms is unpersuasive because the
accountability of administrative agencies through the President remains
exceedingly weak even in light of the increased centralization of the
management of the administrative state.
The accountability of administrative agencies through the President is
weakest with regard to independent agencies such as the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
National Labor Relations Board. The connection of these agencies to the
President is tenuous. Their members are appointed by the President, but
they are shielded from direct presidential control by removal restrictions,
bipartisanship requirements, and lengthy staggered terms that leave
appointees of the President’s predecessor in office for at least a substantial
period in a new President’s first term. Rules issued by these agencies are
not subject to the rigorous centralized review applied to agencies within
traditional government departments, and often these agencies are more
receptive to pressure from members of Congress than from the President or
other Executive Branch officials.
Even for agencies firmly within the Executive Branch, accountability
through the President is greater, but not necessarily very strong.
Centralized review, presidential appointment of department heads and
agency heads, and power to discharge uncooperative officials all combine
to place Executive Branch agencies under greater presidential control than
the independent agencies. Agencies within the Executive Branch,
however, are still subject to intense political pressure from many fronts,
including, most notably, Congress.
When agencies succumb to
congressional pressure, this may not be democracy-enhancing because the
members of Congress involved in the particular matter may represent
88
See Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme Common Law Court of the United States, 18 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 119, 124–28 (2008).
89
See id. at 121–30.
90
See Beermann, Turn Toward Congress, supra note 84, at 749.
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narrow interests, either their own or of their particular constituents, rather
than the interests of Congress as a whole. Congressional oversight can
increase or decrease democratic accountability, depending on the particular
context.91
Even if the only outside influence on agency decision making came
from the President, it is not clear whether this is desirable from a
democratic standpoint. Agencies deal with scores of issues that may never
be salient in a presidential election, when symbolism and overall
leadership qualities may be much more important than the President’s
views on any particular issue likely to come before an administrative
agency. The electorate has a small set of choices for President, and the
President’s views on most regulatory matters are less likely to reflect the
electorate’s preferences than the policies embodied in statutes passed by a
majority of both houses of Congress.92 Given the miniscule degree of
agency accountability through the President, the relative accountability
basis for Chevron depends on a strong rejection of the legitimacy of
judicial statutory interpretation.
One wonders whether Chevron’s
supporters are willing to apply this distrust of judges across the board to all
the ways in which federal courts interfere with the expressed preferences
of the other branches of federal and state governments.
There is an additional factor that has not been well-integrated into the
discussion of the legitimacy of Chevron: the fact that the Court justified
Chevron deference in part based on the fact that statutory interpretation
often involves policy considerations.93 To use Chevron itself as the
example, the question for the agency was not only whether the bubble
concept was consistent with the term “stationary source,” but also whether
using the bubble concept was a sensible method of regulating air pollution.
The Chevron Court stated that “the decision involves reconciling
conflicting policies.”94 The opinion then speculates on why the policy
issue was not resolved by Congress, and offers as one possible answer that
“[p]erhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the
balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged
with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better

91

See Beermann, Congressional Administration, supra note 71, at 122–23.
This analysis assumes that, but for Chevron deference, the agency’s action would be found by a
court to be contrary to Congress’s intent as expressed in the (ambiguous) language of the relevant
statute. Of course, if reviewing courts are advancing the personal preferences of the judges, then the
agency’s action should be upheld. If, however, judges are doing their best to put their own preferences
aside and decide cases in line with what they think Congress would want, then the question becomes
much more complicated. It would then boil down to whether agency accountability and the possibility
that judges are not able to set aside their preferences are sufficient to outweigh the possibility that the
reviewing court’s statutory interpretation accurately reflects congressional intent.
93
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
94
Id. at 865.
92
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95

position to do so.”
The Court goes on to support its preference for
agency decision making based on expertise and accountability.96
The involvement of policy may help explain why Chevron
jurisprudence is such a mess. Linguistically, the doctrine is presented,
constructed, and elaborated as a method of review for questions of
statutory interpretation focusing on statutory meaning, but in many of the
cases the real question is whether the agency has employed its delegated
power wisely, and one reason offered for deference is agency policy
expertise. The Chevron framework is not suited to review of policy
decisions, where the statutory arbitrary, capricious framework governs. It
is as if the Court handed out tape measures and instructed people to weigh
objects with them.97
Chevron presented two distinct questions, one interpretive and one
policy. The interpretive question was whether the statutory term
“stationary source” required that each smokestack or vent be treated as a
separate source of air pollutants.98 The policy question was, assuming
statutory authority, whether it was arbitrary or capricious for the agency to
treat the aggregation of smokestacks and vents at a factory as a single
stationary source under the statute.99 Policy decisions, such as whether
automobiles should be required to be equipped with passive restraints, or
what gas mileage a fleet of automobiles should be required to achieve, are
typically reviewed under the arbitrary, capricious standard and do not fit
well within the Chevron framework. Because many, and perhaps most,
policy questions can be connected to an issue of statutory meaning, it
cannot be that the Court intended virtually complete judicial renunciation
of policy review so long as policy concerns are connected to a question of
statutory meaning.100
The more conventional view, based on the language of the Chevron
opinion, is that Chevron is largely about “agency interpretation of
statutes.”101 There are those, however, who view Chevron as primarily
95

Id.
Id. at 865–66.
97
Cf. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy.”).
98
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
99
This separation is not necessarily completely clean because whether something is arbitrary or
capricious may, in some circumstances, be measured by whether it comports with the statutory
standards. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
100
It would be odd to think that the Court would decide the Airbags Case, which announced a
relatively stringent standard of review under the arbitrary, capricious standard, and in the very next year
establish, with Chevron, a nearly toothless standard for reviewing policy decisions that are connected to
issues of statutory meaning. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. (Airbags Case), 463 U.S. 29, 41–42 (1983).
101
Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 401 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
96
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about policy, not about statutory interpretation. For example, Michael
Herz stated in an article published not long after Chevron was decided that
“[w]hat ‘binds’ a court, then, under both the traditional
interpretive/legislative rule distinction and under Chevron, is not agency
interpretation but agency legislation—the adoption of a particular policy
within the boundaries established by the statute.”102 Herz’s conclusion
depends in part on the Court’s explicit exception from Chevron deference
for “pure question[s] of statutory construction.”103 Writing more recently,
Michael Harper also views Chevron as largely about review of agency
policy decisions, but he adds that “formulations of legal doctrine should
include the serious arbitrary or capricious review delineated in decisions
like State Farm.”104
It is difficult to figure out what to make of the distinctions among
agency law making, policy making, and pure questions of statutory
construction under Chevron. It is doubtful that the Court intended Chevron
Step Two’s incredibly deferential permissible construction or reasonable
interpretation standard to be appropriate for reviewing policy decisions.
Because the arbitrary, capricious standard is the normal APA standard of
review for agency policy decisions, if the real issue is not about meaning,
but rather is about the wisdom of an agency policy, then the Chevron
framework is an awkward fit.
To attempt, as some have done, to integrate Chevron and review of
policy decisions creates some of its own logical problems. Early on in the
life of the Chevron doctrine, Judge Harry Edwards argued in favor of a
third step in Chevron cases.105 Judge Edwards reasoned that in cases in
which the agency’s interpretation is upheld in Steps One and Two, the
reviewing court should consider, in a third step, whether the agency’s
interpretation is arbitrary and capricious under APA section 706(2)(B).106
This makes sense in light of the Chevron opinion’s invocation of agency
expertise to resolve policy conflicts as a reason for deference. However,
insofar as Chevron and its progeny purport to be about agency statutory
interpretation (although perhaps not about “pure questions of statutory
construction”), it is difficult to imagine that a reasonable or permissible
construction of a statute could be arbitrary and capricious as a matter of
policy. If the construction of the statute is consistent with Congress’s
102

Herz, supra note 85, at 199.
Id. at 222–25.
Harper, supra note 54, at 210.
105
See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The various
arguments over how many steps are or should be in the Chevron process are discussed below.
106
See id. at 338 (“Even if the ICC is not without authority under the ICA to review arbitration
awards, a question remains whether the agency’s announced decision to do so was ‘arbitrary or
capricious.’ . . . [W]e must consider whether the agency abused its discretion in exercising the quasilegislative authority delegated to it by Congress.” (citation omitted)).
103
104

2010]

END THE FAILED CHEVRON EXPERIMENT NOW

807

intent, then the agency has by definition considered the factors Congress
intended it to consider and made a decision within the policy boundaries
established by Congress. In this light, the two-step process makes no sense
except perhaps as a different way of stating the arbitrary, capricious
standard in the statutory interpretation context.107 If that is what the Court
intends, the Court could simply apply a highly deferential version of the
arbitrary, capricious standard as it does in other contexts.108
If the Supreme Court were to choose to make only one clarification to
the Chevron doctrine, it should clarify the interaction between Chevron
and judicial review of agency policy decisions. If Chevron deference is
really about deference to agency policy decisions, then it seems to be
running on a parallel track to review under the arbitrary, capricious
standard with no reasoning as to which is the proper track in any particular
case. If it is not about deference to policy decisions, then the Court needs
to explain the proper standard of review for policy decisions that are
connected with questions of statutory meaning.
Justice Scalia has offered an additional justification for Chevron—
agency flexibility.109 In his view, a great virtue of the Chevron doctrine is
that it allows agencies to change their statutory interpretations upheld in
Chevron Step Two as long as subsequent interpretations are also
reasonable or permissible.110 The Brand X111 decision made clear what had
long been understood about Chevron, that when a reviewing court
107
See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1276 (1997) (suggesting that Chevron Step Two is simply arbitrary, capricious review).
108
The Court has prescribed a highly deferential application of the arbitrary, capricious standard
for reviewing agency denials of petitions to bring enforcement action and agency denials of petitions to
engage in rule making. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (“Refusals to
promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is ‘extremely limited’ and
‘highly deferential.’”); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975) (holding that a narrowly
limited scope of judicial review should apply to reviewable agency refusals to initiate enforcement
proceedings). I do not necessarily agree that the standard of review of policy decisions made in the
course of statutory interpretation should be more deferential than the usual standard. The Court has,
however, adjusted the strength of the arbitrary, capricious standard in other contexts, and there is no
reason why it could not do so here as well if it was concerned that ordinary arbitrary, capricious review
would be too stringent.
109
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 244 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Is it likely—or
indeed even plausible—that Congress meant, when such an agency chooses rulemaking, to accord the
administrators of that agency, and their successors, the flexibility of interpreting the ambiguous statute
now one way, and later another . . . ?”).
110
See id. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that where Chevron applies, agencies are free to
replace previous statutory interpretations as part of their continuing discretion).
111
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). Justice
Scalia dissented in Brand X because he viewed the Commission’s interpretation of the provisions at
issue in the case as unlawful. Id. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also expressed concern over the
application of the principles of Mead (Chevron Step Zero). Id. at 1014–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He
did not, however, disagree with the basic premise that agencies are free to adopt a new permissible
construction of a statute if an agency’s prior construction had been approved on judicial review. Id. at
1016 n.11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He did, however, disagree with applying that premise when the
court’s initial decision had not been made under Chevron. Id. at 1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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approves an agency’s statutory interpretation as permissible, the agency
remains free to adopt a different permissible interpretation, unless the first
decision was based on clear congressional intent under Chevron Step
One.112 Without deference to statutory interpretation, once an agency’s
interpretation is upheld on judicial review, it can be altered only by an
amendment to the statute or by convincing the reviewing court to overrule
its prior decision. Both options are likely to be difficult to accomplish.
Getting Congress to pass any statute is very difficult, and statutory
precedents are thought to have the greatest force in conventional
understandings of the case law system.113 Flexibility in statutory
interpretation would mirror flexibility in non-interpretive policy matters—
as the Court has recently stated, changes in agency policy are not subject to
heightened review under the arbitrary, capricious test.114
Applying Brand X can be complicated because it may not always be
easy or even possible to discern whether an initial decision was based on
clear statutory meaning or deference to an agency’s views. This is
especially true for decisions that pre-date Chevron or the APA, but even
the post-Chevron decisions are sometimes confusing as to what step the
Court is applying when it approves an agency interpretation.115
Adding to the difficulties with the Chevron framework, the Brand X
decision has proven easy to circumvent. In the Cuomo decision, Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court cited several prior Supreme Court decisions,
dating back to 1819, for the proposition that the phrase “visitorial power”
did not include judicial enforcement of state law.116 The dissent accused
the Court of violating Brand X—since the Court had determined that the
statute was ambiguous, prior judicial understandings were not relevant
under Brand X because those cases had not definitively determined the
meaning of the statute at issue.117 The only question should have been
112
The application of this aspect of Brand X has also proven controversial. See infra notes 115–
17 and accompanying text.
113
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 31–33 (1949).
114
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810–11 (2009).
115
The Court makes this determination difficult by sometimes jumping to Chevron Step Two
without first announcing that the statute is ambiguous. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 (2009) (discussing whether an agency’s interpretation is reasonable without first
addressing whether the statute is ambiguous); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696–703 (1995) (same). In Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of
Education, 550 U.S. 81, 90–99 (2007), in an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Court first determined that
the agency’s interpretation was reasonable and then decided that the statute was ambiguous. The Court
switched the order of analysis because the language of the statute pointed strongly against the agency’s
interpretation. Id. at 89. In his dissent, Justice Scalia found the agency’s interpretation contrary to the
statute’s plain language. Id. at 109–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2716–17 (2009) (citing Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 8 (2007); First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640,
660 (1924); Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 157 (1905); and Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 676 (1819)).
117
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2728–29 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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whether the new interpretation was permissible under Chevron Step
Two.118 Justice Scalia’s response was that he was using the old cases as
evidence of the meaning of the statutory phrase, not as binding authority.119
Justice Scalia is technically correct, but on reflection, his distinction is
difficult to sustain, given that the Court is always free to overrule its prior
decisions. In truth, all precedent is evidence of what the law is, not a body
of rules that are binding at the Supreme Court level.
In any case, flexibility may be a virtue of Chevron but it does not
provide a theoretical basis for the doctrine. There are many possible
practices regarding agency statutory interpretation with varying degrees of
flexibility. The Court could retain flexibility outside of the Chevron
context by identifying situations in which it finds that an agency’s
interpretation is within the range of reasonable or permissible
constructions.120 Flexibility does not overcome objections based on
statutory text, principles of statutory interpretation, and administrative law
traditions. In sum, Chevron’s departure from the text of the APA and
traditional understandings of the distribution of power between agencies
and courts has not been adequately justified.
B. Problems Applying Chevron
The next five enumerated reasons for overruling Chevron fall into the
“problems in application” category. Several of these are connected to the
first category, intrinsic problems, and the third category, costs and benefits
of applying Chevron, particularly those involving uncertainty, which leads
to increased litigation costs. These five reasons for overruling Chevron are
as follows: (1) the Chevron opinion was poorly constructed and unclear on
basic issues; (2) a short time after establishing the Chevron doctrine, the
Court created a new version of Step One, which threw the doctrine into
disarray and spawned several competing versions of Step One, leading to
conflicting lines of cases; (3) Chevron did not have the desired effect of
increasing deference to agencies but instead left reviewing courts free to
118

Id. at 2730–31 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2717 n.2.
Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Brand X that this sort of flexibility is not possible outside the
Chevron framework. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia characterized Neal as “reject[ing] the notion that any form
of deference could cause the Court to revisit a prior statutory-construction holding.” Id. at 1016 n.11
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996)). But Neal is not
dispositive because in that case, the Court’s initial interpretation was on direct review in a criminal case
without the benefit of an administrative construction. Neal, 516 U.S. at 288. Nothing in Neal would
preclude the Court from allowing agencies to reinterpret statutes when the initial judicial determination
was made on deferential judicial review. Justice Scalia may be correct that an agency should not be
allowed to adopt an interpretation that had previously been rejected on judicial review, but he is
incorrect insofar as his argument holds that the Neal reasoning precludes an agency from adopting an
interpretation different from one that had been previously approved but that had never been previously
rejected itself.
119
120
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reach any desired result; (4) the Supreme Court does not even cite Chevron
in a high proportion of the cases in which it arguably applies, which means
that something is wrong with the doctrine; and (5) Chevron created
uncertainty over when it applies, which made it necessary for the Court to
construct a complicated and unclear doctrine to determine Chevron’s
domain, known as Chevron Step Zero.
1. Chevron Was Poorly Constructed and Unclear on Basic Issues
The Chevron opinion itself, and the doctrine that has grown out of it, is
a failure because it does not provide clear answers to the issues it raised
and thus led to great uncertainty and diversity of understanding and
application. Many of these problems with Chevron have been adverted to
above and are reviewed here only briefly.
The first problem discussed in this subsection is the mess the Court
created with Chevron Step Two. As previously discussed, there is a lack
of factual basis for the Court’s assertion that whenever Congress is unclear,
it intends to delegate interpretive power to the administering agency.121
This subsection discusses another problem, the lack of clarity of the
Court’s explication and application of Chevron Step Two. In constructing
Step Two of Chevron, under which reviewing courts defer to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, the Court distinguished between
explicit and implicit delegations of interpretive power to agencies. The
Court first stated that whenever Congress has not directly spoken to the
precise question at issue, the statute is therefore silent or ambiguous on
“the specific issue, [and] the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”122 Then the
Court went on to distinguish between explicit gaps, where the agency
interpretation is reviewed under the “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute” standard and implicit gaps, which are reviewed
under the “reasonable interpretation” standard.123
The origins of the Chevron Step Two dichotomy turn out to be very
interesting. There was, before Chevron, a tradition in administrative law to
give less deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes than to
agency legal decisions under explicit grants of interpretive authority. As
the Court explained in 1981:
We consider Treasury Regulations valid if they
“implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable
manner.” In National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States,
440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979), we stated: “In determining
121

See supra Part II.A.2.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
123
Id. at 843–44.
122
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whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional
mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute,
its origin, and its purpose.” Harmony between statutory
language and regulation is particularly significant in this
case. Congress itself defined the word at issue—“wages”—
and the Commissioner interpreted Congress’ definition only
under his general authority to “prescribe all needful rules.”
Because we therefore can measure the Commissioner’s
interpretation against a specific provision in the Code, we
owe the interpretation less deference than a regulation issued
under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term
or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision.
Where the Commissioner acts under specific authority, our
primary inquiry is whether the interpretation or method is
within the delegation of authority.124
Thus, the pre-Chevron understanding was that agency interpretation of
an ambiguous statute was reviewed for reasonableness—does the agency
interpretation “implement the congressional mandate in a reasonable
manner”? This was a less deferential standard of review than Chevron
because it involved a careful look at statutory language, origins, purpose,
and legislative history, and it did not presume that ambiguity meant that
Congress intended to delegate lawmaking power to the agency. The final
say on the correctness of interpretation of an ambiguous statute would lie
with the reviewing court. With regard to an explicit delegation of
interpretive authority, the agency’s interpretation would be reviewed under
the more deferential inquiry of whether the interpretation “is within the
delegation of authority.” In Chevron and another 1984 decision, the Court
transformed this standard into the highly deferential “plainly” or
“manifestly” contrary to the statute.125
With regard to the basis for the Court’s formulation of Step Two, recall
that the APA appears to presume that legal questions would be resolved by
courts, not agencies. Step Two should be based either on statutory text or
pre-APA principles that might have been incorporated into the APA. The
Court’s formulation of Step Two, however, seems to be inconsistent with
the desire of the framers of the APA to rein in agencies. The Chevron
Court cited cases in support of both variants of Step Two, but the case law
cited did not provide much support. As noted above, in a case involving an
explicit delegation of power to an agency, a week before Chevron was
decided, the Court used the phrase “plainly contrary to the statute” to
124
125

Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252–53 (1981) (citations omitted).
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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describe when a reviewing court should overturn an agency
interpretation.126 The other cases relied on in Chevron for the “manifestly
contrary to the statute” language do not contain any similar phrase, and in
fact are confusing on the status of agency interpretations under explicit
delegations. For example, in 1981’s Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, the
Court stated:
In view of this explicit delegation of substantive
authority, the Secretary’s definition . . . is “entitled to more
than mere deference or weight.” Rather, the Secretary’s
definition is entitled to “legislative effect” because, “[i]n a
situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary,
rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for
interpreting the statutory term.” Although we do not abdicate
review in these circumstances, our task is the limited one of
ensuring that the Secretary did not “excee[d] his statutory
authority” and that the regulation is not arbitrary or
capricious.127
This pre-Chevron passage is notable for three separate ideas that are
highly relevant under Chevron. First, the Court equates legislative intent
to confer the status of law on agency interpretations with a high degree of
deference to agency interpretations,128 although it does not provide much
guidance on how deferential a court should be in determining whether the
Secretary “exceeded his statutory authority.” Second, it is consistent with
Chevron’s notion that in a case of explicit delegation, Congress assigned
primary interpretive authority to the agency. Third, it states that even if the
interpretation is found to be within the agency’s statutory authority, there
should be an additional inquiry into whether the choice of interpretation is
arbitrary or capricious. This third element has been urged by some, but it
is not clear whether it is proper practice under Chevron.
In another decision relied upon in Chevron for the construction of Step
Two, 1977’s Batterton v. Francis,129 the Court stated a standard of review
similar to that of Gray Panthers, while accurately quoting the statutory
language. “The regulation at issue in this case is therefore entitled to more
than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the Secretary
exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation is ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.’”130 The final case relied on in Chevron for the establishment of the
126

Id. at 834.
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (citations omitted) (alterations in
original).
128
This is the Mead issue. See infra Part II.B.3.
129
432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977).
130
Id. at 426 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)).
127
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“manifestly contrary to the statute” standard for reviewing explicit
delegations, the pre-APA American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United
States,131 does not support it at all, but is about deference to policy
decisions. It does mention that the agency must remain within its statutory
authority but it does not discuss further the standard the reviewing court
should apply when determining whether an agency has done so.132 Thus, at
best there are hints of the explicit delegation branch of Chevron Step Two
going back to 1977, but apparently not before. There is certainly no preChevron support for treating ambiguous statutes as implicit delegations of
interpretive authority to agencies.
The “permissible” or “reasonable” construction standard for reviewing
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, when the
delegation of agency interpretive authority is implicit, appears to be more
consistent with the general practice under the APA, although perhaps not
in the highly deferential way that it has been understood since Chevron.
Numerous cases that arose after the passage of the APA and before
Chevron applied the reasonable construction or reasonable interpretation
standard of review to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.133
These cases looked carefully at statutory text, purpose, and history, which
may not be the case in post-Chevron Step Two decisions. In many cases,
however, courts went even further and used the phrase “reasonable
construction” or “reasonable interpretation” as a synonym for “correct
construction.”134 This indicates that these phrases did not have a settled
meaning in the period before Chevron.
The tradition, however, is less clear before the APA. Many pre-APA
cases use the terms “reasonable interpretation” and “reasonable
construction,” but in most contexts these phrases seem to mean the correct
interpretation or the best interpretation in light of the circumstances.135
131

299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936).
Id.
See, e.g., EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 84 (1980) (“[W]e believe that the
Administrator has adopted a reasonable construction of the statutory mandate.” (emphasis added)).
134
See, e.g., FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 357 (1968) (rejecting the FTC’s reading of a
statute in favor of what it found to be “the most reasonable construction of” the statute). For additional
cases using this language in various senses, see Ky. Dep’t of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 717 F.2d
943, 948 (6th Cir. 1983) (using the “reasonable interpretation” language in the context of legislation
regarding school district’s usage of funds); Hart & Miller Islands Area Evntl. Group v. Corps of Eng’rs
of U.S. Army, 621 F.2d 1281, 1289 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying the “reasonable construction” of a statute
regarding works that span waterways); Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221,
1228 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that a “reasonable construction” of the ADEA affords complainants a
choice of forum).
135
See Harris v. Zion Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 453 (1943) (“[T]he rule comports
with what we have endeavored to show is the natural and reasonable construction of [the statute].”);
Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 581 (1941) (“[T]he operation of the statutes taxing income is . . .
dependent upon . . . the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act.”). In some cases,
however, “reasonable interpretation” was used to denote an interpretation within an allowable statutory
range that was also rational as a matter of policy. See Mother Lode Coal. Mines Co. v. Helvering, 317
132
133
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The Hearst case, for example, used the phrase “reasonable basis in law” to
denote a deferential standard of review in cases involving the application
of an ambiguous legal standard to a particular situation, which is different
from a question of statutory interpretation.136 At least in the years
immediately prior to the enactment of the APA, there was no clear
understanding that there should be deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes under a reasonable interpretation standard.
Since Chevron, the Court has applied the “reasonable construction”
standard numerous times in cases involving ambiguous statutes.137 Express
delegations of interpretive power are rarer, and therefore the Court has not
had many occasions to apply the “manifestly contrary to the statute”
standard to such delegations. Adding to the confusion, the Court has gone
so far as to cast the “manifestly contrary” standard as the standard for
reviewing all policy decisions made by agencies with rulemaking
authority, not only decisions involving statutory interpretation.138 And in
some instances, the Court has applied it in cases of ambiguity,139 which are
supposed to be governed by the “reasonable or permissible construction”
standard.
Perhaps this all indicates that the Court does not perceive any real
differences among these situations or standards of review. It may also be
U.S. 222, 225 (1942) (noting that the meaning given is “practically compelled by the words” of the
statute and also a “reasonable interpretation”). “Reasonable construction” was also used to denominate
the correct interpretation of a clause in a contract. See Ill. Steel Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 320 U.S.
508, 515–16 (1944). Sometimes it is not possible to discern whether the Court is using “reasonable” to
mean “correct” or simply within a permissible statutory range. See Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States,
252 U.S. 140, 145 (1920). National Lead is particularly interesting because it involves judicial review
of an agency determination.
136
NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
137
The Court’s general statements of the standard of review under Chevron Step Two have not
been particularly illuminating and have at times even appeared to be circular. For example, in an early
Step Two case, the Court stated that the test is whether the agency interpretation is “sufficiently
rational . . . to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of [the agency].” Young v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
138
See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (“When Congress expressly
delegates to an administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts must
give the agency’s decision controlling weight unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute.’” (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))). The full quote
from Chevron indicates that the Court there was addressing agencies filling statutory gaps, not making
policy under statutory standards:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (emphasis added).
139
See Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004) (“Because § 1605 is
ambiguous, the Board’s regulation implementing § 1605 ‘is binding in the courts unless procedurally
defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” (quoting United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001))). In Smiley, the Court appears to use the two
standards—reasonable interpretation and manifestly contrary to the statute—interchangeably. See
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742–47 (1996).
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due to the view expressed in some opinions that when Congress grants an
agency rulemaking authority, all ambiguities become express delegations
of interpretative power.140 This is certainly not consistent with the text or
original understanding of Chevron, nor with the numerous pre-Chevron
cases in which the reasonable or permissible construction standard is
applied to agencies with rulemaking power. This means that there may be
a third category not originally captured by Chevron—when an agency that
has been granted the power to make legislative rules makes new law
designed to implement a statutory provision, the “manifestly contrary to
the statute” standard is applied to determine whether the agency has acted
within statutory constraints.141 Whatever one thinks of these various
permutations of Chevron Step Two, one thing seems clear—the Court has
not succeeded in creating a clear and easy to administer standard of review
for agency interpretations of law.142
Another problem with the Chevron doctrine is that the Court is unclear
about the relevance of legislative history and policy to judicial review of
interpretive decisions. The Chevron opinion contains two separate
discussions of legislative history. The first, Part V of the Court’s opinion,
is a brief demonstration that the legislative history does not directly
address the issue in the case, namely whether Congress intended to
foreclose the plant-wide definition of stationary source.143 This discussion
is consistent with “traditional tools Chevron,” given that legislative history
is one of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation. The second occurs
in Part VII of the opinion in which the Court refutes the NRDC’s
arguments based on statutory text, legislative history, and policy.144 This
second discussion repeats the conclusion that the legislative history is
“unilluminating” and rejects the argument that because the EPA has
changed its definition, its interpretation is not entitled to deference.
140
See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 102 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 528 (1990) (“Since the Social Security Act
expressly grants the Secretary rulemaking power . . . ‘our review is limited to determining whether the
regulations promulgated exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority and whether they are arbitrary and
capricious.’” (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 145 (1987))).
141
For example, in a 1997 opinion, the Court characterized review under the SEC’s broad
rulemaking authority as follows:
Because Congress has authorized the Commission . . . to prescribe legislative rules,
we owe the Commission’s judgment “more than mere deference or weight.”
Therefore, in determining whether [the rule] is reasonably designed to prevent
fraudulent acts, we must accord the Commission’s assessment “controlling weight
unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” In this case,
we conclude, the Commission’s assessment is none of these.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424–
26 (1977), and Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
142
See Jellum, Which Is To Be Master, supra note 57, at 760 (“There is no consistency, just a
muddy battlefield.”).
143
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851.
144
Id. at 859–66.
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Overall, the discussion of legislative history fits pretty well with a
traditional tools version of Chevron Step One and, because legislative
history does not seem relevant to whether an interpretation is manifestly
contrary to the statute, a reasonable interpretation version of Chevron Step
Two.
Chevron’s discussion of policy is more consistent with original,
directly spoken Chevron than with subsequent, less deferential, iterations
of the Chevron standard. The Court characterized NRDC’s policy
arguments as an attempt to refight a policy battle that it lost at the agency
level and in the states that implemented that decision, but that was never
brought to Congress’s attention. The Court then stated that the policy
arguments should be addressed to the agency and to Congress, but not to
the courts. The Court concluded strongly that, at least when a “regulatory
scheme is technical and complex, [w]hen a challenge to an agency
construction of a statutory provision . . . really centers on the wisdom of
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a
gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”145 This is extremely
deferential, since it seems to say that policy decisions made within a gap
left by Congress will not even be reviewed under the arbitrary, capricious
standard.
The possible abdication of review of the wisdom of agency
interpretation raises the lingering issue of the relevance of the arbitrary or
capricious standard. Does the Court mean to foreclose reversal of an
agency choice even if, on a fair assessment of its wisdom, the Court would
find it to be arbitrary or capricious? This seems to be contrary to the preChevron cases discussed above, and to some recent formulations of the
Chevron standard, in which the Court specifically referred to the
possibility that an agency policy choice under an explicit delegation might
be rejected as arbitrary or capricious.146 Perhaps the problem is that if it is
really an interpretation, and if it falls within the statutory bounds and goals
established by Congress, then it cannot be arbitrary or capricious since, as
the Court has recently stated, the wisdom of an agency policy is judged
against the statutory provisions enacted by Congress.147 If Congress
includes unwise choices within the range of interpretations that are
permissible or not manifestly contrary to the statute, then the courts should
145

Id. at 865, 866.
Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007) (the wisdom of agency policy is
judged against statutory standards). Ron Cass argues that any measure of deference to the EPA’s
judgment on the appropriate exercise of its statutory discretion would have resulted in affirmance of the
agency’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gases as air pollutants. See Ronald A. Cass,
Massachusetts v. EPA; The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75, 83
(2007). While Cass may be correct, it remains unclear how Chevron is relevant to the policy question
of whether, assuming jurisdiction, the agency ought to regulate greenhouse gases at this time.
146
147

2010]

END THE FAILED CHEVRON EXPERIMENT NOW

817

approve the agency interpretation, perhaps with some advice to Congress.
2. Multiple Chevrons
Perhaps the greatest problem in the application of the Chevron doctrine
is that the Court very quickly abandoned the original, apparently highly
deferential, version of the doctrine and replaced it with multiple versions
that, if followed, can lead to different results. The Chevron doctrine has
basically disappeared and lacks the content necessary to remain a viable
decision procedure.148 I call the various versions of Chevron that currently
exist “original directly spoken Chevron,” “traditional tools Chevron,”
“plain meaning Chevron,” and “extraordinary cases Chevron.” Each of
these versions of Chevron is currently applied by the Supreme Court,
except perhaps original directly spoken Chevron, which may rarely, if
ever, be applied.149 What has occurred is that the results of judicial review
of agency statutory interpretation before and after Chevron, especially at
the Supreme Court, are virtually indistinguishable, meaning that the effort
to increase deference to agencies and clarity in the law has failed.
“Original directly spoken to” Chevron is the version of Chevron most
clearly stated in the Chevron opinion itself. Under this doctrine, a case
would be resolved under Chevron Step One only if “Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.”150 In Chevron itself, this would
have meant that for the case to have been resolved in Step One, Congress
would have had to have addressed the exact issue of whether the definition
of “stationary source” could include treating an entire plant with numerous
air pollution emitting installations as a single stationary source. This
version of Chevron Step One is very narrow, which means that under it,
deference to agencies would increase substantially as more cases made it
past Step One and into the highly deferential Step Two. It is also relatively
clear and easy to apply—only the most direct evidence of intent on the
specific subject would result in a decision under Step One, and the vast
majority of cases would easily end up in Step Two. For example, the
statutory analysis in the Chevron opinion is only four paragraphs long and,
with footnotes, only about four hundred words. It does not decide the
meaning of “stationary source” but merely concludes that the statute does
not specifically answer the question in the case.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the original Chevron, had it
remained the law it would have dramatically changed review of agency
statutory interpretation and it would have substantially simplified the
148
For a different take on how Chevron has evolved over the years, see Jellum, Chevron’s
Demise, supra note 83.
149
See Gifford, supra note 64, at 798–801 (describing the “instability” of the original Chevron
doctrine).
150
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
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process of such review. Courts would have been required to defer to
agency interpretations except in the most rare case of agency defiance of a
precise statutory directive.
The seeds of the destruction of original directly spoken Chevron were
sown in a footnote in Justice Stevens’s Chevron opinion itself which
stated:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law, and must be given
effect.151
This language allows for a potentially broader Step One—rather than
require that Congress have “directly spoken” to the precise question, it
requires that Congress “had an intention” on the “precise” question. The
key to whether this footnote amounts to a major expansion of the scope of
Chevron Step One may lie in the word “precise,” and as we shall see, the
word “precise” has since disappeared from the traditional tools lexicon,
severely reducing the scope of deferential Chevron Step Two.
Shortly after Chevron was decided, in another opinion by Justice
Stevens, the Court seized on this “traditional tools” language and began its
discussion, this time in text rather than in a footnote, of the standard of
review as follows: “The question whether Congress intended the two
standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the
courts to decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we
have concluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be
identical.”152 This has evolved into what this Article refers to as
“traditional tools Chevron,” in which the Court uses statutory construction
devices that pre-date Chevron to determine Congress’s meaning in
Chevron Step One.
The best example of traditional tools Chevron is the Court’s opinion in
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, Inc.153 In that case, the Court
began its discussion of the standard of review for statutory questions as
follows: “On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is to
try to determine congressional intent, using traditional tools of statutory
construction.”154 The word “precise” does not appear in the majority
opinion, so that the determination of congressional intent at Step One
151

Id. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
494 U.S. 26 (1990).
154
Id. at 35 (quoting NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123
(1987)).
152
153
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appears to have evolved into a pre- or non-Chevron practice for
determining congressional intent. The factors the Court has considered
under traditional tools Chevron include statutory text, statutory object and
structure, canons of interpretation, relationship with other statutes,
consistency of agency interpretation, and legislative history. A court using
these tools for discovering Congress’s intent is much more likely to decide
the case in Step One than under original directly spoken Chevron. Because
deference to agency views occurs only in Chevron Step Two, expanded
Step One entails reduced deference. Perhaps the icing on the cake was that
the majority opinion did not cite Chevron itself until the very end of the
opinion, and then only for the anti-deference point that “[i]f the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”155
Justice Stevens has also used the characterization of an issue as a “pure
question of statutory construction” to argue that Chevron deference should
not apply at all since pure questions of statutory construction are for the
courts. For example, very recently in Negusie v. Holder,156 Justice
Stevens, in dissent, argued that the question in the case is a “pure question
of statutory construction for the courts to decide.”157 Thus, rather than
remand the case to the agency for a proper construction of the statute as the
majority had done, he would have had the Court construe the statute and
remand the case to the agency only for an application of the statute to the
particular facts.158
As is easy to imagine, the proponents of Chevron deference have not
been happy with the expansive traditional tools version of Step One. They
correctly understand it to seriously undermine deference to agencies on
questions of statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, wrote in a concurring opinion in one
traditional tools decision:
I join the Court’s opinion, and write separately only to
note that our decision demonstrates the continuing and
unchanged vitality of the test for judicial review of agency
determinations of law set forth in [Chevron]. Some courts
have mistakenly concluded otherwise, on the basis of dicta in
155

Id. at 43 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43).
129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
157
Id. at 1170 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446).
158
The agency and lower court had interpreted a prior decision, Fedorenko v. United States, 449
U.S. 490 (1981), to require a particular interpretation. The Supreme Court disagreed with this
interpretation of its decision in Fedorenko, which, under Brand X, left the agency free to arrive at a
different interpretation. The Court remanded to allow the agency to interpret the statute, with the
understanding that the interpretation would then be subject to review under Chevron Step Two.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1163 (2009). The cases involved situations under which
immigrants applying for asylum based on fears of persecution are disqualified for being persecutors
themselves. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 493; Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162–63.
156
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159

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.

Even Justice Scalia, however, has not confined himself to original directly
spoken Chevron when deciding cases in Chevron Step One. Instead, he
has applied what this Article refers to as “plain meaning Chevron” in
which the Court decides a case in Chevron Step One using only one of the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, namely the plain meaning rule.
This is in keeping with Justice Scalia’s self-assessment that he is more
likely than other judges to find clear statutory meaning.160
The best example of Justice Scalia’s application of “plain meaning”
Chevron Step One is his opinion for the Court in MCI v. AT&T.161 The
issue in that case was whether the FCC had the power to prohibit nondominant long distance telephone carriers (i.e., everyone but AT&T) from
filing tariffs with the FCC. The Telecommunications Act gives the FCC
the power to “modify” its provisions, and the FCC claimed that de-tariffing
nondominant carriers was a modification of the Act’s tariff provisions.162
Justice Scalia’s opinion rejecting the FCC’s reading of the statute relied
primarily on the plain meaning of the word “modify,” which he found to
mean moderate, not fundamental, change.163 He also found that tariff filing
was the heart of the regulatory scheme, so that de-tariffing any carrier was
more than a moderate change. Justice Scalia derived the meaning of
“modify” from dictionaries, and the opinion rejected a single dictionary
that included a “fundamental change” as a meaning of modify.164 The
opinion’s discussion of the meaning of “modify” did not refer to any other
tool of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history,165 statutory
structure and purpose, or canons of construction, and in fact it rejected
using the underlying policy of the provision, stating “our estimations, and
the Commission’s estimations, of desirable policy cannot alter the meaning
of the federal Communications Act of 1934.”166 This variant of Chevron
159

United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See supra note 67; see also Jellum, Chevron’s Demise, supra note 83, at 748–51.
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (MCI v. AT&T), 512 U.S. 218, 225–27 (1994).
162
Id. at 224–25.
163
Id. at 225.
164
Id. at 225–27, 226 n.2.
165
Justice Scalia is an outspoken opponent of using legislative history. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 31–36 (1997) (arguing that legislative
history should not be used because it is not a “proper criterion of the law”); see also Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97–98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“That the Court should refer to the citation of three District Court cases in a document issued by a
single committee of a single house as the action of Congress displays the level of unreality that our
unrestrained use of legislative history has attained.”).
166
MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 234. The Court did, however, look at the overall structure of the
Act to determine that eliminating the tariff requirement would be more than a moderate change, but this
was not to discover the meaning of the statute but rather to apply the meaning arrived at to the
situation. Thus, I disagree with Cass Sunstein’s characterization of MCI v. AT&T as an example of
extraordinary cases Chevron. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236–37
(2006).
160
161
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Step One is broader than original directly spoken Chevron because it does
not require that Congress have answered the precise question in so many
words, but it is narrower than traditional tools Chevron because it confines
the search for congressional intent to the plain meaning of the statutory
language.
The final Chevron variant is “extraordinary cases Chevron,” in which
the reviewing court finds clear congressional intent outside the Chevron
framework in extraordinary cases. The cases are extraordinary because of
the importance of the issue, at least as related to the regulatory scheme.
The best example of extraordinary cases Chevron is the Court’s decision
that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) lacks the power to
regulate the marketing of tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act.167 Although Congress had not directly spoken to the
precise question at issue (whether the FDA had jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco marketing) and the plain meaning of the statute seemed to support
jurisdiction (cigarettes and other tobacco products were within the plain
meaning of drugs and drug delivery devices), the Court found that the FDA
lacked jurisdiction because of the unique legal history surrounding
tobacco, which indicated that Congress did not intend the general language
of the Act to grant the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco.168 The Court
observed:
This is hardly an ordinary case. . . . Owing to its unique place
in American history and society, tobacco has its own unique
political history. Congress, for better or for worse, has
created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products,
167

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142–43 (2000). Cass Sunstein
places MCI v. AT&T and Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, into the
extraordinary cases Chevron category. Sunstein, supra note 166, at 236–40. In my view, the dominant
analysis of each of those cases does not fit easily into the extraordinary cases doctrine. In MCI v.
AT&T, plain meaning analysis dominates, although the Court’s discussion of the importance of tariff
filing is consistent with extraordinary cases analysis. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 225–28. Babbitt,
which involved whether the Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on taking an endangered species
could be read to include habitat destruction, is best understood as a traditional tools Chevron decision,
with focus on statutory text, broad purposes and the relationship of the provision at issue to other
provisions in the statute. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
697–701 (1995). Justice Scalia’s dissent in that case is a prime example of a plain meaning Chevron
argument. See id. at 717–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Abby Moncrieff has argued that proper
application of extraordinary cases Chevron would have led the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA to reject
EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles. See Abigail Moncrieff,
Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of
Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 603–06
(2008) (arguing that the Court should have found that the EPA lacks jurisdiction over global warming
gases).
168
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 141–43. The Court also relied on a
conventional traditional tools argument based on the structure of the Act, as follows: The Act requires
the FDA to ban any product that is not safe and effective for its intended purpose. Tobacco products
are unsafe. Therefore, if the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco products, it would be legally bound to
ban them, which Congress clearly did not intend, and which the FDA did not argue for. Id.
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squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over
tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from
exercising significant policymaking authority in the area.
Given this history and the breadth of the authority that the
FDA has asserted, we are obliged to defer not to the agency’s
expansive construction of the statute, but to Congress’ [sic]
consistent judgment to deny the FDA this power.169
In a sense, the extraordinary cases version of Chevron is a device for
deciding the case in Step One when ordinary statutory interpretation
principles point toward a meaning contrary to the Court’s view of
Congress’s true intent.170
The existence of these four variants of Chevron epitomizes what is
wrong with the doctrine and why it should be abandoned. The range of
possible reasons for deciding a case in Chevron Step One is so broad that
almost any case can be so decided, which means there is no deference to
the agency. Further, the Court can choose to ignore traditional indications
of congressional intent and decide based on either whether Congress has
directly addressed the precise issue or on whether the case is extraordinary
and should be decided on a sui generis evaluation of likely congressional
intent. In such cases, the Chevron framework itself has dissolved into the
mist.
Further, the variants are so different from each other that from a
lawyer’s perspective, Chevron has become a moving target. Should a
lawyer arguing a case address whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise issue in question, whether Congress’s intent can be discerned using
traditional tools or the plain meaning rule, or whether the particular case is
so extraordinary that it should be taken out of the methodology altogether?
Apparently, a competent lawyer should address all of these possibilities,
unless somehow it becomes easy to predict which variant a court will apply
in a particular case.
3. When Chevron Applies: Chevron Step Zero
Because the Chevron doctrine appears to create a remarkably strong
form of deference, agencies have a powerful incentive to argue, whenever
plausible, that their interpretations should be evaluated under Chevron.171
Thus, although the Chevron opinion on its face appears to create a standard
for review of all questions of statutory construction decided by

169

Id. at 159–60.
For an additional case that may fit into the extraordinary cases version of Chevron, see
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006) (“The importance of the issue of physician-assisted
suicide . . . makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.”).
171
This Article uses “appears” because in many cases, this appearance is not the reality.
170
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172

administrative agencies, the Court found it necessary to create a doctrine
to determine when it applies.173 Without a limiting doctrine, agencies
could use Chevron strategically, issuing ill-considered interpretations as
litigation positions to receive extraordinary deference if the statute
contained a gap or was ambiguous.
The jurisprudence governing the scope of Chevron has been dubbed
“Chevron Step Zero” because the determination of whether Chevron
applies is made prior to applying Chevron Steps One and Two.174 The
Court’s decisions on whether Chevron applies are deeply flawed, primarily
because they disavow any legal content. Justice Souter’s opinion for the
Court in United States v. Mead Corp.,175 the leading case on the scope of
Chevron, is the prime example.176 Mead involved whether tariff
classifications issued relatively informally, but treated by the agency as
binding between it and the party whose product has been classified, should
receive Chevron deference. Justice Souter catalogued the factors that the
Court has found relevant to whether an agency’s interpretation should
receive Chevron deference, but he was careful not to characterize any
factor as decisive. Consider the care with which the following passage is
constructed to avoid containing any actual binding law:
We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed. It is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect
of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that
172

Except perhaps for those that can be characterized as “pure question[s] of statutory
interpretation,” which are “for the courts to decide.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
(1987).
173
Before the APA was enacted, there was a convention that when Congress provided a penalty
for violating an agency rule, it was understood that Congress intended the agency rule to have the force
of law. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 472 (2002). Dick Pierce has argued against limiting the
applicability of Chevron deference to a subset of agency interpretation on the ground that this would
limit the realization of the democracy and accountability enhancing goals of the doctrine. Pierce, supra
note 61, at 562–65.
174
See Sunstein, supra note 166, at 191 (describing “Step Zero” as “the initial inquiry into
whether the Chevron framework applies at all”). The disagreement over the number of steps in
Chevron is discussed infra Part II.B.5.
175
533 U.S. 218, 227–34 (2001).
176
Other decisions on the scope of Chevron, rendered both before and after Mead, do not make
the doctrine any clearer. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–22 (2002) (noting that while
Chevron deference will normally apply in cases of statutorily prescribed rule making or adjudication,
the lack of formal process in an agency’s decision making did not bar the application of Chevron);
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586–88 (2000) (holding Chevron deference not warranted
with regard to opinion letters, policy manuals, and other decisions lacking force of law).
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should underlie a pronouncement of such force. Thus, the
overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication. That said, and as
significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the
case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was
required and none was afforded. The fact that the tariff
classification here was not a product of such formal process
does not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron.177
Note that the Court says that notice and comment does not
automatically qualify an agency decision for Chevron deference and the
absence of notice and comment does not automatically disqualify an
agency decision from receiving Chevron deference. The question whether
any particular agency decision should receive Chevron deference is
whether Congress intends that the agency be able to speak with the force of
law, with rulemaking power being a “very good indicator” of such intent.
In Mead, the Court found a lack of congressional intent to endow tariff
classification rulings with the force of law for several reasons. First, the
legislation itself did not indicate that Congress intended tariff rulings to
have the force of law. The statute did authorize the agency to promulgate
procedural regulations, and it referred to the tariff classifications as
“binding rulings,” but the reference to “binding rulings” according to the
Court meant that the rulings were binding between the agency and the
particular party, not binding on third parties which would give them
legislative effect.178 In fact, the agency had disavowed any effect on third
parties.179
In addition to the lack of congressional intent for the customs rulings
to have the force of law, the Court relied on several additional factors for
declining to confer Chevron deference on the rulings. These factors
177

Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 232.
179
Id. at 232–33. The Court noted:
It is true as well that Congress had classification rulings in mind when it explicitly
authorized, in a parenthetical, the issuance of “regulations establishing procedures
for the issuance of binding rulings prior to the entry of the merchandise concerned.”
The reference to binding classifications does not, however, bespeak the legislative
type of activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling, once
the goods classified are admitted into this country. . . . Customs has regarded a
classification as conclusive only as between itself and the importer to whom it was
issued, and even then only until Customs has given advance notice of intended
change. Other importers are in fact warned against assuming any right of
detrimental reliance.
Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2006); citing 19 CFR § 177.9(a), (c) (2000)) (footnotes omitted).
178
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include the fact that customs rulings are issued without notice and
comment, by forty-six different field offices, at a rate of over 10,000 per
year, and are subject to “independent” judicial review by the Court of
International Trade.180
In effect, the decision in Mead complicates the presumption underlying
Chevron that when a statute is ambiguous or contains a gap, Congress
intends the agency to be the primary interpreter, subject to judicial review
for reasonableness.181 After Mead, the presumption regarding
congressional intent is not valid unless Congress provides an additional
indication, such as authority to issue legislative rules, that it intends to
confer lawmaking power on the agency. The greatest problem with the
Mead opinion is that it does not provide any certainty regarding what
additional indications are required. Rather, by merely reciting a laundry
list of factors that have been found relevant in prior cases, the Court invites
protracted litigation over every plausible claim for and against Chevron
deference.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mead contains a devastating critique of the
majority opinion. His main point is the one discussed above, that the
Court’s decision does not contain any legal rule that can be applied or
relied upon in the future.182 In his view, Mead is likely to cause a great
deal of confusion for the parties subject to it and the lower court judges
180
This last point, that judicial review is “independent” is a very sloppy characterization of
judicial review of tariff rulings. The applicable statutory language, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2639–2640 (2000),
provides that the agency action reviewed is presumed to be correct, that the burden is on the challenger
to establish its incorrectness by clear and convincing evidence, and that the standard of review is
supplied by the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). What Justice Souter meant by “independent” is unclear
since judicial review under this provision, if it differs from judicial review generally, is somewhat less
deferential than usual given the presumption of correctness and the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard. Further, the Court has elsewhere found that a non-deferential standard of judicial review is
not a basis for denying legal determinations Chevron deference, further undercutting this basis for
denying Chevron status to the agency ruling in Mead. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526
U.S. 380, 390–92 (1999) (concluding that a statute authorizing further proceedings in the Court of
International Trade to reach “correct decisions” is not inconsistent with Chevron deference). Haggar is
discussed further in Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2, at 840–41 (“The Court [in Haggar] was willing
to assume that Congress has the power . . . to spell out unambiguously that questions of law as well as
questions of fact were to be decided de novo.”).
181
For an effective critique of Mead, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1458–75 (2005) [hereinafter Bressman,
Mead].
182
Somewhat inconsistently, Justice Scalia has on more than one occasion accused the Court of
either requiring some sort of formal procedure such as notice and comment rule making for Chevron
deference or of recognizing notice and comment rule making as a “safe harbor” for Chevron deference.
See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1015 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court explicitly disavowed any such requirement, as Justice Breyer has
pointed out in response to Justice Scalia. See id. at 1014 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court [in Mead]
explicitly stated that the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking did ‘not decide the case,’ for the
Court has ‘sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative
formality was required and none was afforded.’ And the Court repeated that it ‘has recognized a variety
of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron deference.’” (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted)).
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183

charged with applying it. He is also concerned that agencies will engage
in wasteful rulemaking proceedings just to be able to claim Chevron
deference for interpretations that would have otherwise been rendered less
formally.
Justice Scalia’s opinion suggests an alternate path: Chevron deference
should apply whenever an interpretation reflects the official position of an
agency on a matter that would otherwise qualify for Chevron deference—
where there is an ambiguity, a gap, or an express delegation of interpretive
authority. This reasoning applies most strongly when an interpretation is
rendered by or approved by a high level official. Congressional
specification of a “relatively formal procedure” such as adjudication or
notice and comment rule making may be less indicative of intent to
delegate power to make rules with the force of law than congressional
delegation of a question directly to a Cabinet Secretary. Justice Scalia
argues that Congress is more likely to intend the decisions of a high level
official to have the force of law regardless of formality than the decisions
of a low level administrative law judge employing formal adjudication.
Justice Scalia also attacked the Court for reviving Skidmore deference
in cases in which Chevron does not apply. In the pre-APA Skidmore case,
the Court concluded that agency interpretations should receive deference
based on numerous factors indicating relative persuasiveness, such as the
formality of procedures used, the consistency of the agency’s interpretation
over time, and whether agency expertise is important to the decision being
reviewed.184 Skidmore, being an all things considered standard for
determining how much, if any, deference an agency interpretation ought to
receive, is anathema to Justice Scalia’s professed preference for clear rules
183
Justice Scalia’s prediction has been validated by subsequent experience. See, e.g., United
States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Our decisions understandably have
been conflicted as to whether Chevron deference only applies upon formal rulemaking and whether
lesser deference applies in other situations.”); Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d
913, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (“After Mead, we are certain of only two things about the continuum of
deference owed to agency decisions: Chevron provides an example of when Chevron deference applies,
and Mead provides an example of when it does not.”); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Emprical Investigation of
Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 808–10 (2008) (referring to W.R. Grace and Wilderness Society in discussing
“intrinsic confusion in the doctrine”); see also Criddle, supra note 63, at 1305 n.180 (discussing
Mead’s lack of clarity and the difficulty courts of appeals have had in applying it). Criddle argues that
Chevron deference is based on five core factors:
(1) congressionally delegated authority, (2) agency expertise, (3) political
responsiveness and accountability, (4) deliberative rationality, and (5) national
uniformity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, none of these overlapping rationales
can be properly considered redundant; since the Court decided Mead, it has
consistently withheld Chevron deference when any one of these core rationales is
not satisfied.
Id. at 1275. Criddle may be correct as a matter of diagnosis, but the five factors are too pliable to serve
as an actual legal standard that could function as a method for discerning whether Chevron deference
should apply in a particular case.
184
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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over vague standards.
Merrill and Hickman, writing in 2001, noted that the Court has decided
numerous cases regarding the scope of Chevron and they identified
fourteen unanswered questions concerning the scope of Chevron’s
applicability.185 The questions identified by Merrill and Hickman linger,186
including such basic questions as whether agency interpretations rendered
in adjudicatory proceedings are entitled to Chevron deference,187 whether
rules exempt from notice and comment, such as interpretative rules and
procedural rules, are entitled to Chevron deference,188 and whether
Chevron deference can apply to an agency that lacks the power to issue
legislative rules.
There are even arguments over whether some of the issues have been
resolved or not. For example, one of the open issues identified by Merrill
and Hickman is “[whether] Chevron appl[ies] to interpretations that
modify the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction? (An issue subject to a
conflict in the circuits and raised, but not resolved, in Brown &
Williamson.)”189 But at least some of the Justices thought that this issue
had been resolved more than ten years earlier in favor of applying Chevron
to interpretations that affect an agency’s jurisdiction.190 While it is correct,
185

Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2, at 849–52.
Merrill and Hickman’s fifth question, whether agencies receive Chevron deference for
interpretations of their own regulations, seems to have been answered in the affirmative. Before
Merrill and Hickman wrote, the Court had held that an interpretation contained in a brief, which
apparently reflected a longstanding agency view, was entitled to substantial, although not Chevron,
deference. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“Because the salary-basis test is a creature
of the Secretary’s own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (citation omitted)). More recently, the Court
has implied that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation would receive Chevron deference if it
met Mead standards of formality. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129
S.Ct. 2458, 2473 (2009) (“The Memorandum, though not subject to sufficiently formal procedures to
merit Chevron deference, is entitled to a measure of deference because it interprets the agencies’ own
regulatory scheme.” (citations omitted)).
187
The Court may have answered this question in the affirmative. Merrill and Hickman state that
the issue is resolved with regard to the Board of Immigration Appeals “but not more generally.”
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2, at 850. The general question seems to have been answered at least in
dicta in Mead, which stated that in order to qualify for Chevron deference, an interpretation must have
been rendered in a congressionally authorized “process of rulemaking or adjudication.” United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). Merrill and Hickman’s article was published while Mead
was pending at the Supreme Court.
188
To Merrill and Hickman’s questions, I would add another: Assuming rules issued without
notice and comment do not receive Chevron deference, if an agency gratuitously provides notice and
comment for an exempt rule, is the rule then eligible for Chevron deference?
189
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2, at 851. Cass Sunstein has argued against Chevron deference
for agency decisions concerning their own jurisdiction on the ground that “Congress would be unlikely
to want agencies to have the authority to decide on the extent of their own powers.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2099 (1990). Michael Herz also has
an excellent discussion of this issue. See Herz, supra note 85, at 193–203.
190
See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43–44 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the issue had been resolved in prior cases in which the Court had applied Chevron to agency
statutory decisions affecting their jurisdiction). But see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2, at 844 n.54
(concluding that whether there is a jurisdictional exception to Chevron deference is unresolved).
186
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as Justice White stated in a concurring opinion, that the Court has applied
Chevron deference to interpretations that affect an agency’s jurisdiction, it
is also correct that the Court has not explicitly stated that jurisdictional
interpretations are subject to Chevron. Thus, the uncertainty identified by
Merrill and Hickman persists over the issue in the lower courts.191 What
makes this issue even more problematic is that even if the Court was
sympathetic to the argument that jurisdictional interpretations should not
be afforded Chevron deference, there may be “no discernible line between
an agency’s exceeding its authority and an agency’s exceeding authorized
application of its authority. To exceed authorized application is to exceed
authority.”192
It is not necessarily fatal to the desirability of a precedent that its
meaning and application must be developed in subsequent decisions, but it
ought to count as a negative when a precedent requires numerous complex
decisions simply to determine its scope. These problems with Chevron are
especially intolerable because the Chevron doctrine is a framework for
decision making and not a substantive doctrine. The Court’s approval of
the bubble concept for regulating stationary sources of air pollution has
turned out to be the least important aspect of the Chevron decision as a
precedent. Rather, the decision, at least as understood later, established a
framework for judicial review. Many substantive doctrines need years and
several cases to work out. The same should not be true of a standard of
judicial review or similar decisionmaking framework. These should be
ready to go, simple to apply, and relatively stable unless and until the
Court decides to make a change.193
Chevron Step Zero is thus problematic for reasons beyond guilt by
association with Chevron. As the Court has constructed it, it has made a
191

Merrill & Hickman, supra note 2, at 844 n.54. The Third Circuit believes the issue was
resolved long ago by the Supreme Court: “The Supreme Court has also held that an agency’s view of
its own statutory jurisdiction may be entitled to deference under Chevron.” Air Courier Conference of
Am./Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
However, more recently, Judge Prost of the Federal Circuit wrote, “[A]n agency’s determination of the
scope of its own authority is not entitled to Chevron deference.” Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2009). At the moment, the D.C. Circuit supports the Third Circuit, although its position has
shifted. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We afford
Chevron deference to the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction.”). For more coverage of this issue,
including citations to numerous articles on the subject, see Bressman, Mead, supra note 181, at 1472–
73; Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency
Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1503–07.
192
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
193
Consider, on the one hand, the standard for granting summary judgment. Although the Court
has made changes in that standard, the framework itself was relatively clear and stable until the Court
decided to make a change. E.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986). On the other
hand, consider that one of the reasons for changing the procedure for determining qualified immunity
cases was that lower courts had resisted the prior standard and had found it necessary to create
numerous exceptions to the process. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817 (2009).
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controversial and complicated inquiry even more so, without any reason to
believe that it improves the process of judicial review or results in better
agency or judicial decision making. It is the bathwater that ought to be
thrown out along with Chevron. The lack of any clear rule concerning
when Chevron applies provides, in itself, a powerful argument for
abandoning the Chevron framework altogether.194
4. The Failure of Chevron to Increase Deference to Agencies
The most striking objective measure of the failure of Chevron is that it
does not appear to have succeeded in substantially increasing the level of
deference to agency statutory interpretation. The studies that have been
done show that immediately after the Chevron decision, the rate of
affirmance of agency interpretations rose substantially, especially at the
court of appeals level, but then in subsequent years it has settled back to a
rate that is very close to where it was before Chevron.195 That Chevron has
not had much, if any, effect at the Supreme Court level should not be
surprising in light of one study’s finding that Chevron is cited in only
about one-third of the cases in which it is potentially relevant.196 Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, the study found that approval of an agency
interpretation is less likely in cases in which Chevron is cited. This is
probably because the Court often cites Chevron Step One’s statement that
“[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”197
It is important that the study considers deference in the lower courts,
because a possible defense of Chevron is that while it may have failed at
the Supreme Court level, it has served its purposes well at the lower courts.
This would be true if the rate of deference to agencies was substantially
higher post-Chevron in the lower courts and also if decision making
appears to have become much simpler at the lower court level. There is,
however, no good evidence that either of these possibilities is true,
194
As noted above, Justice Stevens has argued that Chevron does not apply to “pure question[s]
of statutory construction” because, in his view, such questions are for the courts to decide. See
discussion supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. This basis for not applying Chevron is
different from the issues dealt with by the Mead standard but it is related in the sense that Justice
Stevens must be proceeding from the premise that Congress has not delegated to agencies the authority
to resolve pure questions of statutory interpretation.
195
See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 32 (1998) (finding an increase of regulations upheld
under Chevron from 58% one year after the Chevron decision, to 82% two to four years after Chevron,
and then decreasing to 72% ten years after the Chevron decision); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein,
Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,
849 (2006) (noting that the “average validation rate of the circuit judges in Chevron cases . . . is
roughly similar to that of the Supreme Court [J]ustices”); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1031, 1039
(finding an affirmance rate of 70.9% in 1984, peaking at 81.3% in 1986, and decreasing to 75.5% in
1988).
196
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1121.
197
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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although they do merit more study. Schuck and Elliot’s study indicates
that after an initial increase, agency affirmance rates in the lower courts
settled back close to pre-Chevron levels.198 While it is beyond the scope of
this Article to engage in a detailed study of lower court applications of
Chevron, a glance at recent decisions of the D.C. Circuit reveals that
application of Chevron in that circuit looks similar to its application in the
Supreme Court, producing lengthy, complicated, and contentious
opinions.199 There is thus no reason to believe that Chevron has been more
successful in the lower courts than at the Supreme Court.
In a recent and exhaustive study of Chevron, Eskridge and Baer found
that Chevron is cited in only a small minority of Supreme Court cases in
which it is, on its terms, relevant.200 They report that in 1014 cases
involving agency interpretation, the Chevron two-step process was cited in
8.3% of the cases.201 In about 40% of the cases, some other form of
deference was applied.202 And in more than half of the cases, 53.6% to be
exact, no deference regime was applied.203 In other words, as Eskridge and
Baer conclude, in more than half of the post-Chevron cases in which the
Supreme Court reviewed an agency interpretation, the Court applied what
the authors term “[t]he old ‘independent judgment of judges’ approach that
predated the modern administrative state.”204 In addition, the authors
report that more than 70% of the cases were decided with either no
deference or a slightly deferential “consultative deference” regime,205
which means that in the vast majority of cases of review of agency
198

Schuck & Elliott, supra note 195, at 1039.
See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Nat’l Cement Co. of Cal., 573 F.3d 788, 792–93 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
Novelty, Inc. v. DEA, 571 F.3d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Tatel, J., concurring); FedEx Home
Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Many of the D.C. Circuit decisions cite
Chevron but then appear to engage in traditional statutory construction, enveloped perhaps in a false
veneer of deference.
200
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1121. My own casual reading of Supreme Court decisions is
consistent with this finding. There are many decisions in which Chevron would seem to be relevant but
is not mentioned at all.
201
Id.
202
For example, in reviewing interpretations rendered by the NLRB in the course of formal
adjudication, the Court apparently often cites Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S.
27 (1987), rather than Chevron, on the scope of review. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud,
The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for
Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2083 n.263 (2009). For example, Fisk and Malamud note that the Court
cited Fall River Dyeing rather than Chevron when it rejected the NLRB’s statutory interpretation in
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994). The fact that the Court
seems to have developed a unique standard of review for NLRB statutory interpretation decisions after
Chevron was already on the books is a strong indication of the weakness of the Chevron framework.
The Court’s standard of review of Board interpretations is whether the Board’s decision is “rational and
consistent with the Act” which on its face seems to be less deferential than Chevron. NLRB v. Health
Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 576 (1994); see also NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc.,
532 U.S. 706, 725 (2001) (applying the “rational and consistent” standard).
203
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1121.
204
Id. at 1121.
205
Id.
199
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interpretations, the agencies’ views receive little or no deference from the
Supreme Court. If Chevron is such an attractive doctrine, you would think
that its creator would apply it in more than a small minority of cases.206
Traditional tools and plain meaning Chevron should help explain why
Chevron does not result in greater deference to agencies. Once the Court
opened the Step One inquiry to the broad range of factors that had long
been applied in statutory interpretation cases, it made it much easier for a
court to find clear congressional intent under Step One and either affirm or
reverse the agency without deferring. Justice Scalia’s confidence in his
ability to discern statutory meaning, and his application of plain meaning
Chevron, also places more cases in Step One.
It is necessary, however, to be cautious about using affirmance rates as
the measure of the level of deference. There is some evidence that agency
interpretation has become more adventurous in light of Chevron as
agencies hope that they can get away with more under an extremely
deferential standard.207 As agency interpretations stray farther from
statutory language and legislative intent, the affirmance rate could decline
even under a deferential standard. Thus, it may be that although the range
of permissible interpretations is wider than it was before Chevron, agencies
are more likely to test the limits and suffer rejection of their adventurous
interpretations.
In my judgment, both explanations are partly true. It does appear that
agencies have become bolder in their interpretations as the Chevron
doctrine signals the potential for greater deference. However, the
regularity of rejection of agency interpretations under Step One from both
the liberal and conservative wings of the Court, and the similarity of
Chevron to some elements of pre-Chevron case law, leaves the impression
that the more things change, the more they stay the same, and that the
Chevron doctrine is not having much of an effect. There is, however,
probably greater deference at the court of appeals level. Given circuit
judges’ lack of control over their dockets, Chevron can be an easy way of
deciding numerous cases and thus an effective docket clearing device as
potential challengers consider whether pursuing judicial review is likely to
produce good results.
Further, the fact that Chevron is not even cited in most cases in which,
by its terms, it ought to apply, may say more about the failure of the
Supreme Court as an institution than about the failure of the Chevron
206
There may be a selection problem behind the lack of application of the Chevron framework at
the Supreme Court level. The Court tends to select the most complicated and important cases to hear.
In that universe of cases, the Chevron framework may be less likely to produce easy answers.
Regarding important cases, simple invocation of the Chevron framework to affirm the lower court may
not be palatable.
207
See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2005).
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doctrine. If Chevron is such an attractive doctrine, however, one would
expect that the Court would apply it in all or at least nearly all of the cases
in which it provides the governing rule. This provides a strong direct
argument for abandoning Chevron. What we now have are parallel lines of
cases including multiple Chevrons and non-Chevron review of agency
interpretation, with various legal standards that can lead to different results.
In other words, the law is in no better shape than it was prior to the passage
of the APA and in the pre-Chevron APA period. The only positive effect
of Chevron may have been to provide fodder for scholarly analysis. And
as this analysis continues, the case for overruling Chevron should get even
stronger.
Why has Chevron not led to greater deference to administrative
agencies? Without commenting on judicial behavior in other eras, it seems
that judges today are not accustomed to deciding cases according to rules
when the result of applying the rules would conflict with the judges’ own
views on how the case should be decided. Whether judges are pursuing
their own policy preferences, as Czarnezki’s study of judicial review of
EPA rules under Chevron suggests,208 or pursuing what they see as the
correct legal result based on Congress’s intent, courts today seem unable or
unwilling to sacrifice correctness in each case in favor of the advantages of
clear rules. The explicit disavowal in Mead of any rule governing the
applicability of Chevron and the development of multiple versions of
Chevron Step One are but two illustrations of the tendency in current law
to eschew inflexible rules that might stand in the way of judges’
satisfaction with the outcome in each case.
5. How Many Steps?
The final problem with Chevron in application discussed here is that
even after twenty-five years, disagreement persists over the basic question
of how many steps the Chevron doctrine contains. The conventional
wisdom is that there are two steps, one in which the reviewing court
decides whether Congress’s intent is clear, and a second in which, after
finding no clear congressional intent, the court determines whether the
agency’s interpretation is permissible, reasonable, or manifestly contrary to
the statute. If we consider the inquiry into the scope of Chevron as Step
Zero, then Chevron may have three steps. Further, it has been argued that
the reviewing court should also apply the arbitrary, capricious standard to
the permissible or reasonable interpretation, adding a third or fourth step,
depending on when or how you are counting.209 This was how review of

208

Czarnezki, supra note 183, at 770.
In 1988, the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Harry Edwards, a former administrative law
professor, after concluding that the agency’s interpretation was permissible under Chevron Step Two,
209
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statutory issues had been characterized by the Supreme Court in some preChevron opinions. This approach has apparently been followed in many
decisions in the courts of appeals,210 although the Supreme Court has never
explicitly endorsed it or actually engaged in arbitrary, capricious review of
a permissible statutory interpretation.211
Recently, an argument broke out among administrative law scholars
over whether Chevron has one step or two. Matt Stephenson and Adrian
Vermeule argued that Chevron has only one step.212 They argued that the
only question is whether the agency’s interpretation is permissible because
if Congress’s intent is clear, then only an interpretation consistent with that
clear intent can be permissible.
They argued that the two-step
characterization of Chevron has caused needless confusion and should be
jettisoned. Ken Bamberger and Peter Strauss responded that Stephenson
and Vermeule are incorrect.213 In their view, Step One of Chevron is a
pinpoint inquiry into whether Congress has compelled resolution of the
question at issue either with or against the agency’s interpretation, while
Step Two allows the Court to assess the reasonableness of an interpretation
arrived at free from congressional compulsion. Bamberger and Strauss did
not agree that this separation of the inquiry is confusing and found it
perfectly sensible.214
If there are ever winners in a scholarly debate, Stephenson and
Vermeule seem to have had the better of this argument, at least partially.
In a very recent decision, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion collapsed the
inquiry under Chevron into one step, stating that the agency view “governs
if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.”215 In response to the
dissent’s complaint that Justice Scalia’s opinion does not follow Chevron,
the opinion states:
The dissent finds it “puzzling” that we invoke this
proposition (that a reasonable agency interpretation prevails)
applied arbitrary, capricious review to test the wisdom of the choice among permissible interpretations.
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
210
See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2005)
(applying Chevron and the arbitrary, capricious test).
211
The Court recited the arbitrary, capricious standard in Chevron itself, and it has continued to
do so in later cases, but it has never actually engaged in arbitrary, capricious review of a statutory
construction under Chevron—i.e., it has never asked whether the agency considered all relevant factors
or made an error in judgment in its choice of permissible or reasonable construction. See Household
Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004) (stating the “arbitrary or capricious” standard
but not applying it in instant case); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(same).
212
Mathew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597,
597 (2009).
213
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 624–25
(2009).
214
Id.
215
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1500 (2009) (citations omitted).
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at the “outset,” omitting the supposedly prior inquiry of
‘‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.’’ But surely if Congress has directly
spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation
contradicting what Congress has said would be
unreasonable.216
This may signal that the Supreme Court may, in the future, omit the
Chevron two-step process in favor of a single inquiry into the
reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation. It did so again in a decision
issued a week later,217 but on the same day as the first one-step opinion was
issued, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court applied the more
familiar two-step version of Chevron, providing at least a consolation prize
to Bamberger and Strauss.218
Unfortunately, Stephenson and Vermeule threw a spanner into the
works when they suggested that permissible or reasonable interpretations
are still subject to “State Farm” review for reasoned decision making under
the APA’s judicial review provision.219 As noted above, the Supreme
Court has not subjected interpretations approved under Chevron Step Two
to further review under the arbitrary, capricious test. By arguing for
separate (non-Chevron) arbitrary, capricious review, Stephenson and
Vermeule were arguing against collapsing Chevron Step Two with
arbitrary, capricious review since they had previously argued that Steps
One and Two should be collapsed into a single “permissible construction”
inquiry.220 Perhaps they are correct that Chevron Step Two is about
statutory meaning and not about the wisdom of the agency’s policy choice,
but that the wisdom of the agency’s policy choice should be explored in a
separate arbitrary, capricious step.221 However, although the D.C. Circuit
has conducted arbitrary, capricious review as a separate inquiry,222 when
the Supreme Court has mentioned arbitrary, capricious review in Chevron
opinions, it has always included it in Step Two, not as an additional
inquiry. It has also, however, rejected separate arbitrary, capricious

216

Id. at 1505 n.4 (quoting the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens and quoting Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842).
217
The Court employed the one-step formulation again in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S.
Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009).
218
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2471–72 (2009). The
number of steps in Chevron in any given case may turn out to depend on who writes the Court’s
opinion.
219
By “State Farm” review, they meant arbitrary, capricious review of policy.
220
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 212, at 599.
221
This conclusion may be correct under the current understanding of Chevron, but it is contrary
to the pre-Chevron understanding of review of agency interpretations for reasonableness. See
discussion, supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
222
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.

2010]

END THE FAILED CHEVRON EXPERIMENT NOW

835

223

scrutiny of interpretive choices.
Thus, Stephenson and Vermeule’s
argument that permissible constructions are subject to “State Farm” review
is speculative, at best, at least as far as the Supreme Court is concerned.
This brings us back to the complete mess that the Supreme Court has
made of the relationship between Chevron and arbitrary, capricious review.
As discussed above, whether a permissible or reasonable interpretation can
still be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion is a puzzling
question. If an agency interpretation is truly interpretive, and it is within
the range of interpretations contemplated by Congress, it is difficult to see
how it can be permissible or reasonable but also arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. Agency action is reviewed for consistency with
Congress’s instructions. Once such consistency is established, it seems
impossible for the agency action to be incorrect. One D.C. Circuit opinion
argued against applying traditional arbitrary, capricious review to agency
interpretations for similar reasons:
[M]uch of the “arbitrary and capricious” style analysis
concerned with reasoned agency decisionmaking that is
articulated in the Overton Park and Airbags line of cases
cannot be applied directly to the question of whether an
agency’s interpretation of a statute is “contrary to law.” It
would be inappropriate, therefore, to import wholesale that
body of law and apply it in a conceptually distinct arena.224
The court argued that an agency interpretation should be upheld if the
agency gives a reasoned explanation for it. If, however, an agency choice
of interpretation is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, it is
difficult to see how it can at the same time be consistent with Congress’s
intent. This assumes that Congress writes statutes that are arbitrary or
capricious. This is one of the numerous complications that have arisen
under Chevron that would not exist if the Chevron doctrine was
abandoned.
Chevron thus has anywhere from one to four steps depending on what
and how one counts. After twenty-five years, we should expect more
clarity regarding the application of a framework doctrine like Chevron.
C. The Costs of Chevron
The two remaining reasons for overruling Chevron involve the costs
223
In one opinion, the Court treated this issue as follows: “The incumbents make the additional
argument that it was arbitrary or capricious for the FCC to reject historical costs, but this is simply a
restatement of the argument that the FCC was unreasonable in interpreting § 252(d)(1) to foreclose the
use of historical cost in ratesetting, which we have already addressed[.]” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 527 n.38 (2002) (citations omitted). The Court thus seems to equate reasonable or
permissible interpretation with surviving review under the arbitrary, capricious test.
224
Continental Air Lines v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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and benefits of the Chevron doctrine. These are obviously closely linked
to the high degree of uncertainty the doctrine has created and thus require
less discussion than the others to understand. These reasons are: first, that
the uncertainty discussed above surrounding the application of Chevron
and when it applies has forced courts and litigants to expend inordinate
resources on arguing over the Chevron doctrine; and second, that Chevron
causes two conflicting tendencies in agency behavior and a related sort of
irresponsible judicial behavior. If (perhaps overconfident) agencies view
Chevron as embodying extreme deference, they may disregard
congressional intent and push their own policy views against a discernible,
but not absolutely clear, congressional intent. Reviewing courts likewise
can brush off serious challenges to agency decisions based in congressional
intent by invoking Chevron. Pointing in the opposite direction, agencies
with a more realistic understanding of Chevron may be extra-cautious
because they cannot predict whether their interpretive decisions will be
greeted with deference or suspicion on judicial review.
The first point should be obvious. This Article has only scratched the
surface of the complexities and uncertainties created by the Chevron
doctrine. There is extensive litigation, especially in the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals, concerning the various issues that arise under Chevron
and there are hundreds of law review articles teasing out dozens of issues
and creatively raising problems that no one may have anticipated. It is not
necessarily negative that a legal doctrine needs to be worked out over time
in a case by case manner, but there does not seem to be much value doing
so regarding Chevron. Administrative agencies were not in crisis when
their interpretive decisions were reviewed under pre-Chevron practices.
There are much simpler doctrines that could be used to review agency legal
interpretations that would not require extensive litigation to work out all
the ins and outs and twists and turns of the doctrine. The Chevron doctrine
distracts attention from the real issues in the case, namely the substance of
the agency’s action and the statutes and regulations under which the
agency acted. Had the Chevron doctrine succeeded in simplifying judicial
review or creating substantially more deference to agency interpretations,
that may have saved enough resources and discouraged enough litigation to
make the costs of administering Chevron worthwhile. Although I have no
way of verifying this, based on all of the ink that has been spilled over
whether and how Chevron applies in a particular case, I strongly suspect
that the Chevron doctrine has resulted in a net waste of resources for
parties, lawyers, and judges.
It would be different if Chevron served an important substantive goal
such as observing the separation of powers or preventing judges from
imposing their own will over that of the legislature or agencies. But as
Chevron has evolved, there is good reason to believe that the opposite has
occurred. Chevron has not accomplished the goal of constraining judicial
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decision making. Assuming that the Chevron Court was correct that
ordinary judicial review allows judges to impose their policy preferences,
the multiple versions of Step One allow judges to consider any factor they
considered before Chevron. And if for some reason Chevron does not
work, the court can deem the case extraordinary or find a reason why
Chevron does not apply under Step Zero. In short, Chevron has not
accomplished its primary substantive goal of preventing unaccountable
judges from imposing their preferences over those of the agencies or
Congress.
In fact, Chevron has provided courts with a mechanism for reducing
their accountability by hiding their decisions approving agency action
behind a veneer of deference. In a close case in which the judges agree
with a controversial agency action, rather than approve the action on the
merits, the court can employ a deferential version of Chevron and plead
constraint. In short, careful, considered judgment by judges is no longer
necessary to judicial review of agency statutory interpretation.
Chevron also has costs in terms of accountability, democracy, and the
quality of agency decision making. As discussed above, accountability of
agencies through the President may exist, but it is far from a complete
answer to the democracy deficit caused by increased agency discretion. If
it is true that judicial review, at least in some circumstances, enforces
Congress’s intent against an agency pursuing the administration’s
priorities, then in those circumstances judicial review enhances
accountability and democracy by strengthening Congress’s hand against
the agencies. Of course, I cannot demonstrate definitively that this
possibility outweighs the tendency of judges to assert their own views, but
it is my impression that in many cases reviewing courts at least appear to
be trying in good faith to act in accord with congressional intent.
As E. Donald Elliott has argued, Chevron deference may inspire
agencies to adopt adventurous interpretations, far from any good faith
reading of Congress’s intent. He found this sort of behavior to be part of
the culture in the post-Chevron EPA.225 Not only might this increase the
accountability and democracy problems associated with the administrative
state, it could lead to poor decisions given the relatively lower level of
deliberation necessary to make law in an agency as compared with
Congress. Of course, Congress is far from a perfect institution, and
Congress has enacted its share of bad ideas, but there is an obvious
advantage to the requirements of numerosity of congressional membership,
and bicameralism and presentment that are required for the enactment of a
statute, as compared with adoption by a single agency head, perhaps with
approval from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as part of
225

Elliott, supra note 207, at 3.
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centralized review. There is oversight of agency action by Congress and
the President, but often the most effective oversight device has been
judicial review.
The final reason for overruling Chevron is that, based on the case law
and scholarly commentary, it does not appear likely that the difficulties in
understanding and applying Chevron will be resolved in the near future.
Perhaps Chevron would be worth preserving if it appeared that it was about
to become crystallized into a coherent, workable rule. This does not,
however, seem likely. One reason for this is that the scholarly commentary
is in just as much, if not even more, disarray than the case law. Chevron is
unlikely to become a simple framework for deciding cases. To a certain
extent, this follows from much of what appears above. To the mass of
criticism of Chevron, here I add two factors: first, that there is no stable
coalition on the Court for a particular version of the Chevron doctrine; and
second, that the scholarly commentary does not exhibit signs of coming to
a consensus concerning the proper understanding and application of the
Chevron doctrine.
In cases decided under the Chevron framework, the Supreme Court
tends to split along familiar conservative-liberal lines concerning the
merits of the case at hand rather than on lines about the appropriate level of
deference.226 In other words, the liberals on the Court tend to vote to
226
To illustrate this point, I looked at all of the Supreme Court decisions from the 2005 through
2008 Terms in which Chevron was applied by the majority or argued in a dissent. I found a relatively
consistent voting pattern with the Court splitting along familiar liberal/conservative lines most of the
time. I placed Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in the liberal wing; Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito (2006–08 Terms) in the conservative wing; and Justices
Kennedy and O’Connor (2005 Term) as swing votes. Of the seventeen cases in my sample, seven were
5-4 decisions. Two were decided by a conservative majority deferring to the agency. Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U.S. 644 (2007). Two were decided by a conservative majority not deferring to the agency. Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
One was decided by a liberal majority deferring to the agency, although in that case Justice Alito joined
the liberal wing and Justice Souter dissented against deferring to the agency together with the rest of
the conservative wing. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007). Two were
decided by a liberal majority not deferring to the agency, although in one of those two decisions,
Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009), Justice Scalia was in the majority and
Justice Kennedy dissented in favor of deference together with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito. See also Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008). There was also one 5-3 liberal
decision in favor of deference again with Justice Alito in the majority and this time with Justice Stevens
joining two conservatives in dissent. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). Justice
Thomas did not participate. There were three 6-3 decisions, two with the conservatives plus Justice
Breyer not deferring, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009),
and Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009), and one with the liberals and both swing Justices not
deferring in a 2005 Term case before Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor. Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006). There were four 7-2 decisions. I counted them as liberal or conservative based
on the identity of the dissenters. In two of these decisions, liberals deferred to agencies with Justices
Scalia and Thomas in dissent. Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008); Global Crossing
Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45 (2007). In the other two decisions,
the conservatives did not defer, with Justices Stevens and Souter dissenting in one, Morgan Stanley
Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008), and Justices Stevens and
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uphold what would be considered liberal agency outcomes and to reject
conservative agency outcomes while the conservatives tend to do the
opposite. The wild cards tend to be Justices Scalia, Alito, and Chief
Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia has voted quite frequently against deferring
to an agency,227 usually grouped together with other Court conservatives,
but he also voted with the liberals against deferring in at least one decision
in the last four terms.228 This is consistent with Justice Scalia’s selfassessment that he is more likely than other judges to find statutory
language clear. While Justice Alito is generally part of the Court’s
conservative wing, he has voted four times with the liberals in favor of
deferring to an agency,229 while Chief Justice Roberts voted twice with the
liberals in favor of deferring, indicating that Justices Alito and Roberts
may be more committed to the principle of Chevron deference than their
colleagues.
The voting patterns illustrate that there is no predictable divide on
Chevron. While the pro-deference view has been associated with the
Court’s conservatives and the less deferential, traditional view has been
associated with the Court’s liberals, both of these associations are
inaccurate. In case after case, the Court’s decision breaks down along
liberal-conservative lines on the merits without regard to which side is
congruent with deference to the agency. In almost every divided opinion
in recent years in which Chevron has been invoked, the voting pattern
reflects the liberal-conservative divide on the merits of the case rather than
on the proper application of Chevron. Thus, even if one side took control
of the Supreme Court through several appointments, it is unlikely that the
Court would settle on a consistent application of Chevron. Rather, the
Court would likely become consistent with regard to the political
orientation of its decisions, and would defer, or not, based on whether the
administration’s political orientation continued to be the same.
That is not to say that Chevron is not discussed in the Court’s opinions.
Breyer dissenting in the other, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009). There were two unanimous
decisions in favor of deferring to agencies: United States v. Eurodif S.A., 129 S. Ct. 878 (2009) and
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007). In summary, counting 7-2 decisions as
attributable to the dominant group in the majority (as determined by the identity of dissenters who
always were from one wing or the other) there were six decisions by the conservative wing against
deference, three decisions by the liberal wing against deference, two decisions by the conservative
wing in favor of deference and four decisions by the liberal wing in favor of deference. I recognize that
this is not a scientific survey, but nevertheless I believe that it helps illustrate that for whatever reason,
disparate views about Chevron do not seem to explain voting patterns on the Court.
227
Because he voted against deference in all six of the conservative decisions that went against
the agency, with the liberals in one of their decisions that went against the agency, and dissented
against the liberals in all four of the cases in which they deferred, Justice Scalia’s eleven votes against
deference was the highest number of votes among the Justices against deference. Justice Alito voted
most often in favor of deference with ten votes. See supra note 226 for Justice Alito’s voting record.
228
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
229
Zuni, 550 U.S. 81; Watters, 550 U.S. 1.
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To the contrary, in many of the opinions the proper application of Chevron
is a matter of dispute between the majority and the dissent. If the majority
is affirming the agency’s decision, the dissent will complain that the
majority is being too deferential, perhaps because the issue is one of law
for a court to decide or because the agency’s decision is contrary to
Congress’s intent or the plain meaning of the statutory language. If the
majority is rejecting the agency’s decision, the dissent will complain that
the majority has failed to follow Chevron’s deference requirement. The
conservatives and liberals move from one side of the Chevron fence to the
other. The only factor that is relatively consistent is the political alignment
between the blocs and the substantive issues in the case. Chevron
deference does not appear to be determinative to anyone, except perhaps
Justice Alito and to a lesser extent Chief Justice Roberts, who more often
than others cross ideological lines and defer.
The scholarship on Chevron is also indicative of the unlikelihood that a
consensus, simple framework is likely to soon emerge from Chevron
doctrine. The scholarly commentary on Chevron, even after twenty-five
years, does not exhibit anything approaching a consensus on many key
issues concerning Chevron. The commentary after Chevron was decidedly
negative, reminiscent of the even stronger negative reaction to President
Reagan’s assertion of authority, in Executive Order 12,291, to review
agency rules.230 Although the commentary has turned somewhat more
favorable over time, the lack of consensus and clarity in the commentary
illustrates that Chevron is unlikely in the near future to become a clear,
workable standard for judicial review of agency statutory construction.
The scholarship on Chevron and all of its twists and turns is too
voluminous to summarize or describe in any detail. The decision has been
cited in thousands of law review articles.231 Each major Chevron
development provokes a new flurry of scholarship along the same lines,
most recently regarding Brand X’s holding regarding agency flexibility232
and Mead’s elaboration of Chevron Step Zero.233 Even decades after the
decision, scholarly articles continue to offer novel justifications for and
understandings of the Chevron doctrine, illustrating the unlikelihood that a
230

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 473–76

(1988).

231

See supra note 6 (listing the number of citations to the Chevron decision in Westlaw’s
database of law review articles).
232
See Jerry Ellig & Alastair Walling, Regulatory Status of VOIP in the Post-Brand X World, 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89, 91 (2006); Gifford, supra note 64, at 785–86;
Harper, supra note 54, at 192–93; Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency
Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1024–25 (2007).
233
See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking,
118 YALE L.J. 64, 75 (2008); Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 64; Levin, supra note 107, at
1253–56; Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 429–432 (2006).
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strong scholarly consensus might support the doctrine and help
domesticate it.234 Because the Chevron doctrine is contrary to accepted
principles and yet has strong appeal to some, some of the scholarship
contains creative justifications for or characterizations of Chevron in
attempts to rehabilitate the doctrine. The recent scholarly debate,
discussed above, concerning whether Chevron really has two steps or only
one step is indicative of the degree of diversity of opinions and approaches
regarding Chevron.235
If there were a strong scholarly consensus on Chevron, as to either its
theoretical basis or its application, perhaps over time it could be expected
that, as the numerous issues underlying it were resolved, the doctrine
would become easier to apply and less subject to dispute in litigation.
However, just as judicial consensus appears unlikely, scholarly consensus
does not seem likely to emerge anytime soon.
III. WHY IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OVERRULE CHEVRON
As explained above, there are strong reasons for abandoning the
Chevron doctrine and replacing it with a simpler doctrine that is more
consistent with the values underlying administrative law. This section
explains why Chevron meets the standards that the Supreme Court has
applied to the question of whether it is appropriate, in light of the tradition
of stare decisis, to overrule a particular precedent.
In a recent decision, Pearson v. Callahan,236 the Supreme Court
specified three issues that are relevant to whether overruling a decision is
consistent with stare decisis principles. The Court stated, “Revisiting
precedent is particularly appropriate where . . . a departure would not upset
expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule that was recently
adopted to improve the operation of the courts, and experience has pointed

234
Evan Criddle recently noted that scholars have offered various theoretical justifications for
Chevron, which has affected the development of the doctrine itself. Criddle, supra note 63, at 1299–
1300. Examples from a small tip of the huge iceberg of relatively recent scholarship about the
foundations of the Chevron doctrine include: Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 213; Curtis A. Bradley,
Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000); Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake
supra note 64; Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 64; Gifford, supra note 64; Harper, supra note 54;
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron Should Not Be Converted into a Voting Rule: A Response to Gersen and
Vermeule’s Proposal, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 248 (2007), available at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/content/view/98/23/; Matthew C. Stephenson, The Costs of Voting Rule
Chevron: A Comment on Gersen and Vermeule’s Proposal, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 238 (2007),
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/content/view/99/23/; Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note
212.
235
See supra notes 209–24 and accompanying text.
236
129 S. Ct. 808, 811 (2009). Pearson overruled the requirement established in Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001), that federal courts ruling on qualified immunity first address whether the
defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights before addressing whether the rights were clearly established
enough to overcome the immunity.
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up the precedent’s shortcomings.”
The Court also stated two factors
counseling hesitation before overruling a precedent. First, precedents in
the areas of property and contract rights should not be lightly overruled
because of the higher than usual reliance on such precedents, and second,
statutory construction precedents should not be lightly overruled because
of “the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to
Congress.”238
Chevron meets all of the criteria to allow overruling and does not run
afoul of either of the factors counseling hesitation. First, overruling
Chevron would not upset any legitimate settled expectations. Chevron is
not a substantive rule that people have relied on in structuring their affairs.
As a rule of judicial review, it is unlikely that Congress actually considers
the particulars of the Chevron doctrine when it writes statutes,239 and
insofar as agencies may react to Chevron with adventurous statutory
interpretations, any expectations they may have of getting away with an
interpretation that is contrary to congressional intent are not realistic.
Further, the application of Chevron is so uncertain that no one could truly
rely on it with any substantial confidence.
Second, Chevron is a judge-made rule that, had it functioned properly,
would have, at least in part, improved the operation of the courts. It does
not fit this criterion perfectly, because twenty-five years is not of the same
recent vintage as the rule abandoned in Pearson, and it was developed in
part out of concern for separation of powers principles underlying the
administrative state. Nevertheless, stare decisis principles should not stand
as an obstacle to overruling Chevron. The fact that Chevron has been in
existence for twenty-five years is somewhat misleading because new issues
and elements keep popping up, such as the Step Zero doctrine which is a
much more recent creation. Chevron has not been a settled doctrine for
twenty-five years, rather it has been more like a pot that has never quite
boiled or cooled. Further, the separation of powers principles underlying
Chevron are contested. Some find Chevron itself inconsistent with
traditional understandings of the proper distribution of powers in the
administrative state. In any case, any likely replacement for Chevron
could attend to the separation of powers principles as effectively as
Chevron itself, if not more so.
Third, the entire premise of this Article is that experience with
237

Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816.
Id. (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
239
See Abner J. Mikva, Speech, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) (“As Chevron suggests, Congress could provide very detailed statutory
directives to the agency [to avoid delegation]. . . . Having served in the Congress, I know that it is far
from clear that Congress, as a political body, has either the time or the political will to draft such
minute instructions into law. . . . Even the most delphic legislators simply cannot devise instructions for
all future questions of statutory interpretation that will come before an agency.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Chevron over the years has pointed out its shortcomings. If the Article is
not correct, then the case for overruling Chevron is not made. In my view,
Chevron has failed in just about every possible way and any benefits it
provides do not outweigh the costs.
Chevron does not implicate either of the factors counseling hesitation
before overruling a precedent. Chevron is not a rule of property or contract
law against which transactions or investments have been structured.240
Chevron is also not a rule of statutory construction. If anything, Chevron
was constructed in disregard of statutory language or even contrary to the
language and intent of the APA. In short, principles of stare decisis do not
counsel against overruling Chevron.
In fact, the Court’s reasoning in Pearson supports overruling Chevron.
Pearson overruled the Court’s Saucier rule that when deciding on qualified
immunity in civil rights cases, a court should first decide the constitutional
issue and then go on to determine whether any constitutional right that was
violated was clearly established at the time the defendant government
official committed the violation. Among the problems identified with the
Saucier rule were that applying the rule wasted the parties’ and courts’
resources, that it was met with resistance from lower courts, that it was
contrary to well-established legal traditions, and “[t]he procedure
sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources
on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case.”241
These same criticisms could be leveled at Chevron.
Most notably, the primary source of instability in both the Pearson and
Chevron doctrines is identical, namely, inconsistency with bedrock legal
principles. For Pearson, the problem with the doctrine it overruled was
that it required courts to decide constitutional questions when the decision
might not matter to the outcome of the case. This appeared, to many, to be
a breach of the fundamental doctrine of constitutional avoidance, that
courts should decide constitutional issues only when necessary.242 For
Chevron, the main problem is that, as it has come down, it seems
inconsistent with the tradition of judicial determination of the meaning of
statutes. Any doctrine that goes against the tide of fundamental, wellestablished doctrines would seem to be a good candidate for overruling.
IV. CHEVRON’S REPLACEMENT
The final, and perhaps most difficult, part of this Article is to propose a
replacement for the Chevron doctrine. What the Court should do is declare
240

See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816–17.
Id. at 818.
See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847,
848–50 (2005) (discussing the recent rise in instances where the Court has reached out to decide
constitutional issues, even when doing so is not necessary to the outcome of the case).
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that Chevron has become unmanageably complicated and that some of its
applications are inconsistent with the APA and other governing legal
principles. The best result would be for the Court to disavow the Chevron
two-step framework and apply the APA’s apparent requirement that
reviewing courts decide all questions of law raised on judicial review,
recognizing that in some statutes, Congress may have prescribed a range of
permissible interpretations.243 If, however, the Court is unwilling to go so
far as to eliminate deference to agency statutory interpretation, then three
aspects of the Chevron framework should be explicitly disavowed: first,
the “directly spoken to the precise question at issue” version of Step One;
second, the suggestion that the “permissible” or “reasonable construction”
standard governs review of the wisdom of agency policy; and third, the
incredibly pliable Mead standard for determining whether agency statutory
interpretation is entitled to deference.244
A. Reforms of Chevron
If the basic two-step Chevron framework is maintained, Step One
should be reformed in two different ways. First, the Court should
explicitly disavow the narrow version of Step One under which agency
interpretation governs unless “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”245 This standard was the most startling element of the
Chevron test and has never been accepted as consistent with fundamental
principles of the proper judicial role in judicial review of administrative
action. The Court should make clear that all agency legal decisions are
subject to review for consistency with statutory language and
congressional intent, broadly understood under generally accepted
principles of statutory interpretation. The only concession the Court
should make to the Chevron framework is to acknowledge that sometimes
Congress establishes broad statutory limits within which the agency
exercises discretion subject to judicial review for straying beyond the
statutory bounds of discretion. The reviewing court should explicitly state
when this is so, to preserve the agency’s future flexibility to adopt a
different view of the law in appropriate circumstances.
The permissible or reasonable construction standard in Step Two
should be maintained for those instances in which the reviewing court
determines that Congress intended to grant the agency discretion to make
243
Bill Andersen has suggested a legislative reform that is similar to what is suggested here,
replacing Chevron deference with an amendment to APA § 706(2) enacting a form of Skidmore
deference. See William R. Andersen, Against Chevron: A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957,
964–69 (2004).
244
While I recommend eliminating all three, in fact, each of these aspects of the Chevron
framework operates independently and thus each could be jettisoned separately without regard to
whether the others survive.
245
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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legal determinations within a range of possible statutory meanings. This
would most clearly be the case when a statute contains language such as
“as defined by” the relevant agency. The Court should make it clear,
however, that the agency’s choice of a permissible or reasonable
construction is subject to review under the arbitrary, capricious test. This
is a little trickier than it sounds because of the difficulty, discussed above,
with the idea that a permissible construction could nonetheless be arbitrary
or capricious, given that arbitrary, capricious review centers on whether the
agency has considered only the factors made relevant by Congress in the
governing statute. In addition to considering only those factors, the
agency’s decision also has to represent a plausible consideration of those
factors, and thus can still be arbitrary or capricious even if all relevant
factors have been considered.246 This determination should be made under
the arbitrary, capricious standard established in Overton Park, State Farm,
and their progeny.
Third, the Court should acknowledge that Mead has only made it more
difficult for lower courts to figure out when to apply the Chevron
framework and is not a sensible understanding of congressional intent visà-vis agency authority. Rather, the Court should apply its less deferential
standard of review to all agency statutory interpretations, and should get
into Chevron Step Two only when Congress has explicitly delegated legal
decisionmaking authority by stating that a statutory term is subject to
agency definition247 that would be reviewed under Step Two as noted
above.
B. Replacements for Chevron
If the Court were to decide to simply jettison the Chevron framework
altogether, in a sense, there would be no need for a replacement. If
Chevron was wiped from the books and the Court declared that Chevron
and all of its progeny were no longer good law, the law would revert to
pre-Chevron practice. Under that practice, in the case of an ambiguous
statutory provision, when an agency had the power to make legislative
rules, the reviewing court would determine whether the agency had
implemented the statutory provision in a reasonable manner with attention
to the meaning of the statute, its purpose and history, and the wisdom of its
policy choices under the arbitrary, capricious standard. Pre-Chevron, the
ultimate answer to the reasonableness question was an issue for the
246
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (stating one element of review under the arbitrary, capricious standard is that the agency’s
explanation for its action should not be “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise”).
247
See supra note 68 for examples of statutes in which Congress has expressly granted agencies
the power to define statutory terms.
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reviewing court, with careful attention to the agency’s views and
Congress’s intent. When an agency was expressly granted power to create
law in a gap purposely left in a statute (i.e., where no statute, ambiguous or
not, governed) the pre-Chevron Court stated the standard of review as
follows: “The regulation at issue in this case is therefore entitled to more
than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the Secretary
exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation is ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.’”248 In these cases, the reviewing court would ensure that the
agency’s interpretation was within the range intended by Congress and
would also ensure that the chosen meaning was not arbitrary or capricious
as a matter of policy.
These are not really two different standards of review, but rather are
the same standard applied to two different situations, one in which there is
statutory language against which to judge the agency’s action and one in
which there is not. When agency action under an ambiguous statute is
reviewed, the agency’s interpretation is reviewed for consistency with the
discernible limits imposed by the ambiguous statute. When an agency acts
under an explicit grant of interpretative power,249 there is no statutory
language against which to judge the agency’s action, and the reviewing
court must ensure that the agency has not gone beyond the delegation—for
example, by defining a term that the statute does not assign to the agency
for definition or by defining a term in a way that is beyond limitations
imposed elsewhere in governing statutes.250 In both situations, the
soundness of the agency’s interpretive choice is also subject to review
under the arbitrary, capricious standard.
The pre-Chevron rules governing judicial review of agency
interpretations, if re-adopted, should be unified to make them simpler to
apply. The practice regarding review of agency interpretation of
ambiguous statutes should not depend on whether the agency has been
granted the power to make legislative rules. Rather, whenever an agency
interprets an ambiguous statute, whether in rule making, an adjudication,
or an informal action, the question on judicial review should be the same:
whether, in light of text, purpose, and legislative history, the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable, and whether its policy meets the arbitrary,
248

Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (1976))
(footnote omitted).
249
An explicit grant of interpretive power exists when a statute uses language like “as defined by
agency rule” when referring to a statutory term.
250
Perhaps it would be better to distinguish here between interpretative power and lawmaking
power. Cf. Harper, supra note 54, at 213–14 (“[C]ourts should not allow the Board to distinguish
between Congress’s implicit delegation of lawmaking power through the use of ambiguous statutory
language, and the more explicit delegation of discretion as expressed in the Act’s grant of rulemaking
authority. The exercise of both these formally distinct forms of discretion requires the Board to make
policy decisions, and in doing so to consider the impact on actual labor relations.” (footnote omitted)).
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capricious test. Further, when an agency fills a statutory gap, whether
power to fill the gap has been explicitly granted or not, the agency’s action
should be evaluated using the same standard, i.e., whether the agency has
exceeded its statutory authority and whether the chosen course of action is
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. There is nothing in either of these pre-Chevron standards that is
so deferential that they should apply only when Congress has explicitly
granted lawmaking power to the administering agency.
The biggest question that arises over the use of pre-Chevron standards
is whether it is consistent with the APA’s assignment to reviewing courts
of the responsibility to decide all questions of law. This Article has argued
that the extremely deferential version of Chevron is inconsistent with the
APA, but what about the modified pre-Chevron practice proposed above?
Although it is a close question, it does not appear that the pre-Chevron
regime is inconsistent with the APA’s judicial review provisions. At least
it is not as inconsistent as Chevron. The clearest inconsistency between
Chevron and the APA was that under original directly spoken Chevron, the
reviewing court would become hyper-deferential whenever Congress had
not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”251 Under the preChevron regime, when a statute was ambiguous, the Court either
interpreted the statute itself252 or it determined whether the agency’s
interpretation was “reasonable” in light of the statute’s language, policy,
and legislative history.
This is not quite independent judicial
determination of the meaning of the statute, but it is pretty close. PreChevron, reviewing courts did not step aside whenever the statute failed to
provide a clear answer to the precise question at issue.
The question is even closer with regard to the pre-Chevron regime that
governed review of statutory gaps. In such instances, the cases seem to
leave the formulation of a legal standard to the agency, subject to judicial
review to make sure that the agency did not go beyond delegated power or
adopt a legal standard that was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law. Is it inconsistent with the APA
for the reviewing court to allow the agency to fill the statutory gap? In my
view, it cannot be, for the simple reason that if Congress has truly
delegated the power to fill a gap to an agency, then the reviewing court
applying the pre-Chevron standard is respecting that delegation, i.e., it is
following the law as laid down by Congress. As long as the courts are not
overly creative in finding gaps and delegations to agencies, then the
reviewing court correctly resolves the question of statutory construction by
respecting the delegation of lawmaking authority to the agency. The only
251
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reservation in re-adopting pre-Chevron practice is that reviewing courts
should overturn agency action whenever it is “not in accordance with law,”
not only when it is “patently” or “manifestly” contrary to law. That level
of deference to agency legal determinations is inconsistent with the APA’s
assignment of statutory questions to reviewing courts.
This regime is preferable to the Chevron regime for many reasons. All
of the controversy over whether Chevron applies, and if so how, would
fade away. Courts and parties would no longer need to spend inordinate
amounts of time and energy on Chevron and could focus their attention
where it really should be, on questions of statutory meaning and
administrative policy. Given the abject failure of Chevron to simplify
judicial review of statutory interpretation, the messier outward appearance
of pre-Chevron practice should not be a deterrent to returning to it.
One significant objection to abandoning Chevron Step Two is that the
flexibility that allows agencies to alter their interpretations will be lost.
But this is not necessarily so. There is no reason why the Court, in
overruling or abandoning Chevron, could not preserve that flexibility by
clarifying that when a court finds agency statutory interpretation to be
reasonable or within delegated authority, the reviewing court does not
ordinarily foreclose the possibility that an agency might, in the future,
adopt a different interpretation that could also be reasonable or within
delegated authority.253 The Court has already done this with noninterpretive policy decisions, rejecting a heightened standard of review
under the arbitrary, capricious standard when an agency changes its
policy.254 The Court did this without citing Chevron even though the case
involved the application of a statutory provision.255 The Court reviewed
the agency’s policy under the arbitrary and capricious standard rather than
Chevron, and concluded that there is no heightened standard of review
when an agency changes its policy.256
Of course, if the reviewing court finds that there is only one
permissible construction of a statute, then the court should declare so and
the agency would have no flexibility to change to a different interpretation.
This is the practice under Chevron Step One, and it too would not
necessarily change if Chevron were overruled.
Even if the conclusion is that pre-Chevron practice is inconsistent with
253

Whether this is consistent with the APA is discussed in the following paragraphs.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009).
255
The case involved the agency’s enforcement of the statutory ban on obscene, profane, and
indecent language between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. The FCC was granted the authority to
enforce the ban through fines, license denials, and license revocation. After years of apparently
contrary practice, the FCC decided in 2004 that a single use of certain words violated the ban, and the
Court upheld that change in policy as not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 1806–08.
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As noted above, the Court relied on Vermont Yankee for the proposition that it was not free to
impose a more stringent standard of review to agency action involving a change in policy. Supra note
55 and accompanying text.
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the APA, moving back to it would be an improvement from the current
situation since Chevron is even more inconsistent with the APA. If,
however, these pre-Chevron forms of deference are viewed as too great a
departure from the APA, it seems that the most likely replacement for
Chevron would be Skidmore deference, under which reviewing courts
resolve questions of law with more or less attention to agency views,
depending on the situation. Although, for reasons enumerated below, this
would not be an attractive option, it would be superior to the Chevron
regime, if only because it would eliminate all of the arguing over whether
Chevron applies and the uncertainty over which version of Step One the
reviewing court will apply in a particular case.
Under Skidmore deference, as it has been practiced, reviewing courts
take into account numerous factors in determining how much deference to
afford agency interpretations. These factors include the procedural
formality used by the agency, the consistency of the agency’s
interpretation over time, the level at which the decision was made within
the agency, the apparent thoroughness of the agency’s consideration of the
matter, the relevance of agency expertise to the matter, and the apparent
validity of the agency’s reasoning.257 In one sense, Skidmore is much more
straightforward than Chevron because Skidmore does not include multiple
steps and multiple versions. But it is a very open-ended inquiry and if the
degree of deference appeared important, litigants and courts would end up
expending a great deal of effort mapping each case into the Skidmore
framework. To some, Skidmore is no deference at all—the reviewing court
goes along with the agency when, all things considered, it agrees with the
agency.258 For these reasons, a more constrained, certain doctrine is
preferable to Skidmore.
Another issue is whether agencies could maintain the flexibility to alter
their statutory interpretations under either pre-APA practice or Skidmore.
Justice Scalia has argued that Skidmore was inferior to Chevron Step Two
because under Skidmore the ultimate interpretive decision is made by the
reviewing court and thus could not be altered by the agency.259 This is an
accurate depiction of practice under Skidmore—reviewing courts under
Skidmore arrive at what they consider the correct interpretation while
taking into account the agency’s views. There is nothing, however, in the
nature of Skidmore deference or deference under pre-APA practice that
makes this so. A court could pronounce an interpretation as within the
257
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See Panel, Agency Preemption: Speak Softly, but Carry a Big Stick?, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 363,
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range of possible interpretations without precluding the agency from
adopting another interpretation.260 Similar to current practice, this would
depend on the degree of deference involved in the particular case. A
reviewing court could explicitly note when an interpretation is open to
future revision by the agency and when it is not,261 perhaps with a
presumption in favor of revision to govern those cases in which the court
fails to note the issue.262
This flexibility might still, however, be viewed as inconsistent with the
APA’s apparent assignment of interpretive authority to reviewing courts.
As discussed above, it was the narrowness of Step One and its view that all
ambiguity amounted to an implicit delegation of interpretive power that
rendered original Chevron inconsistent with the APA. Under original
Chevron, it was likely that the reviewing court would rarely find that
Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue, which meant
that the vast majority of cases would be decided in the hyper-deferential
Step Two. This seemed, in light of the language of the APA, to be too
small a domain for congressional intent. It is also arguable that allowing
an agency to change the meaning of a statute is similarly inconsistent with
the APA’s meaning. In my view, if the reviewing court concludes that a
statute can bear a range of meanings, then the court discharges its duty
under the APA by confining the agency to interpretations within that range.
There is merit, however, to the contrary view, and it may be that if
Chevron is overruled due to its inconsistency with the APA, then one cost
of that action would be that agencies hoping to alter their statutory
interpretations would need to persuade courts to allow them to do so under
normal stare decisis standards rather than more flexible standards relating
to judicial review of agency interpretation. At a minimum, courts should
be open to concluding that there is a best answer in an interpretive
controversy that the agency and the reviewing court are bound to follow.
V. CONCLUSION
After twenty-five years of bitter experience, the Supreme Court should
admit that the Chevron experiment has failed. Chevron is inconsistent with
260
See Richard Murphy, A New Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency
Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) (arguing that agencies should be free under
Skidmore to alter statutory interpretation; prior interpretation should be one factor considered under
Skidmore standard).
261
I do not mean that the correct interpretation is absolutely not subject to revision by the agency,
but rather that ordinary principles of stare decisis apply and thus the agency would have to convince the
reviewing court to overrule its prior decision in such cases. Reviewing courts should be somewhat
more open to overruling when the agency charged with administering the statute argues for a different
interpretation, especially if circumstances have changed or if experience under the prior interpretation
has revealed problems.
262
The reason the presumption would be in favor of revision is to give the courts an incentive to
identify the cases in which revision would be governed by ordinary stare decisis principles.
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the APA, has not accomplished its apparent goals of simplifying judicial
review and increasing deference to agencies, and has instead spawned an
incredibly complicated regime that serves only to waste litigant and
judicial resources. Pre-Chevron practice was more sensible and easier to
administer. Barring an admission of complete failure, a simplified regime
constructed without the fictional invocation of congressional intent to
delegate interpretive power whenever a statute is ambiguous would be
more consistent with the APA and the traditional role of courts in judicial
review of agency action. It would also be easier to administer, and more
consistent with the values upon which Chevron itself was supposed to be
based. The sooner the Court throws in the towel on Chevron, the better.

